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At present, there are about 26 ongoing armed selfdetermination conflicts. Some are simmering at a lower level
of irregular or terrorist violence; others amount to more regular
internal armed conflicts, with secessionist groups maintaining
control over significant swathes of territory to the exclusion of
the central government. In addition to these active conflicts, it
is estimated that there are another 55 or so campaigns for selfdetermination, which may turn violent if left unaddressed, with
another 15 conflicts considered provisionally settled but at risk
of reignition.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a world that includes the following independent countries:
Biafra, Chechnya, Katanga, Kosovo, Quebec, and South Ossetia. All of
these territories have made bids to become independent states. All but one of
these failed in their quests, and the status of the one exception, Kosovo,
remains controversial. Understandably, states oppose groups that attempt to
break away from their parent state. International law reflects this negative
stance on secession movements. Colonialism provides a legally recognized
exception to maintaining territorial integrity. International law has come to
recognize the right of colonial peoples to create independent states, that is, a
right to external self-determination. Only recently have courts even
entertained secessionist claims.
While courts such as the International Court of Justice and the Supreme
Court of Canada have only recently (and reluctantly) entertained the legality
of secession, jurists and other scholars have put forth a number of secession
models for courts to adopt. Some jurists use functionality as a criterion for
secession: If a territory can function as an independent state, then
international law should recognize the seceding state.2 Other jurists
emphasize cultural preservation: If a territory has a culture distinct from its
parent state, then international law should recognize the right of a seceding
territory to preserve its culture.3 Still other jurists focus on the economic
gulf between territorial units of a state: If one province basically subsidizes

1

Marc Weller, Settling Self-Determination Conflicts: Recent Developments, 20 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 111, 112 (2009).
2
See infra Part III.B.
3
See infra Part III.C.
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the rest of a state, then international law should recognize the right of that
province to secede.4
The final model, which has recently received the greatest attention from
courts and jurists, treats secession as a remedy for injustices. If a parent state
has thwarted attempts at internal self-determination and inflicted grave harms
on a group residing in a distinct territory within its borders, then international
law should recognize a right to secede. This Article proposes and defends
this Remedial Model of secession.5
Kosovo’s recent unilateral declaration of independence (UDL)6 provides
an excellent opportunity to reconsider grounds for secession and to test the
Remedial Model. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), however, fell
back on the rather unimpressive conclusion that Kosovo’s declaration did not
violate international law.7 What follows is not a doctrinal analysis of the
ICJ’s decision. Rather, the analysis consists of making a normative proposal
of what the ICJ should have said. The power of this approach will become
more evident through comparisons of Kosovo’s claims to those of other
secessionist movements, historical and current.
Part II describes background information on Kosovo before presenting
the elements of a Remedial Model. Throughout this Part, the Model is tested
against actual secessionist claims, past and current. Part III, then, compares
the Remedial Model to other ones found in the literature, including previous
versions of the Remedial Model. Part IV takes on the challenge of how to
implement the Remedial Model, other than through the ICJ. This Article
concludes with a case for elevating the role of human rights treaty bodies,
particularly the Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
(CERD), regarding secession claims.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW, SECESSION, AND KOSOVO
A. Background on the Kosovo Decision
On February 17, 2008, Kosovo’s parliament took the bold step of
declaring Kosovo’s independence.8 Serbia submitted a request to the United
4

See infra Part III.D.
See infra Part III.A.
6
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (Kos. 2008).
7
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in
Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141, para. 84 (July 22) [hereafter Kosovo
Advisory Opinion].
8
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (Kos. 2008).
5

2011]

REMEDIAL SECESSION

109

Nations General Assembly to have the ICJ issue an advisory opinion, and the
General Assembly obliged, asking the following question: “Is the [UDL] by
the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance
with international law?”9 The ICJ answered that “general international law
contains no applicable prohibition of declarations of independence.”10 The
ICJ explicitly dodged the question as to whether international law sanctions a
remedial right to secession.11 Indeed, as Judge Bruno Simma bemoaned in
his dissent, the ICJ missed a rare opportunity to present a much more
sweeping analysis.12 While some have called the ICJ decision judicious, if
not momentous, many jurists have found it disappointing.13 Effectively, and
somewhat facetiously, the ICJ’s decision means that the decision by the City
Council of Killington, Vermont in 2005 and 2006 to secede from Vermont
and join New Hampshire did not violate international law.14 More
charitably, Curtis Doebbler, a law professor, wrote one of the first academic
reactions to the decision, predicting that “it is unlikely to be remembered as
one of the Court’s better attempts to articulate and clarify the law.”15
Another failing of the opinion is that the ICJ examined the factual
circumstances only going back to 1999.16 The analysis developed below fills
in the gaps and directly addresses these important issues.17

9

G.A. Res. 63/3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/3 (Oct. 8, 2008).
Kosovo Advisory Opinion, supra note 7, para. 84.
11
Id. para. 83.
12
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in
Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141, paras. 6–7 (July 22) (separate opinion
of Judge Simma).
13
Curtis Doebbler, Op-Ed., The ICJ Kosovo Independence Opinion: Uncertain Precedent,
JURIST (July 23, 2010), http://jurist.org/forum/2010/07/the-icj-kosovo-independence-ruling-an
-uncertain-precedent.php. For an overview, see, e.g., Roland Tricot & Barrie Sander, Recent
Developments: The Broader Consequences of the International Court of Justice’s Advisory
Opinion on the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, 49 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 321, 336–45 (2011) (contrasting the narrow court opinion with the broader
consequences of the case).
14
See Brian M. Lusignan, One of These Things Is Not Like the Others?: A Comparative
Analysis of Secessionist Movements in Vermont, Quebec, Hawai’i and Kosovo 36–37 (Jan.
2009) (unpublished comment), available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?arti
cle=1002&context=brian_lusignan (placing Vermont’s independence movement within larger
international secession debate).
15
Doebbler, supra note 13.
16
Kosovo Advisory Opinion, supra note 7, paras. 57–77.
17
See infra Part II.C.
10
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B. Legal Analysis
The following is an outline of how a court or some international decision
maker (such as the human rights treaty bodies, especially CERD18 or the
Human Rights Committee (HRC)) should have and should approach
secession claims.19 A court should engage in a three-step inquiry. In the first
stage, it should evaluate the relationship between the two parties—the
claimant entity and the parent state. That finding is a prerequisite to all
subsequent analyses because the court must first establish that a secessionist
relationship exists between the parties before it. The next two stages of the
analysis assess the harms perpetrated by the parent state against the seceding
territory and its people. In these stages, the inquiry should focus first on the
removal of self-determination and second on gross human rights violations.
When considering a secessionist claim, a court should address the
following three questions:
1.

2.

3.

Is the claimant a state-like territory that represents its
people and seeks independence from a parent state,
which itself has a lawful claim on the claimant entity?
(Relational Factors)20
Has the claimant attempted to exercise internal selfdetermination, and has the parent state seriously
thwarted
those
efforts?
(Internal
SelfDetermination)21
Has the claimant suffered or been threatened with
harms that rise to the level of peremptory
prohibitions? (Group Harm)22

This Article addresses each question separately below.
C. Relational Factors
The first question assesses the relationship between the claimant entity
and the parent state. Basically, if a state is claiming to secede, then the court
18

See infra Part IV.B.
For the sake of brevity, the term “court” will be used hereafter as shorthand for “court or
international decision maker.”
20
See infra Part II.C.
21
See infra Part II.D.
22
See infra Part II.E.
19
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should ask this question: What is seceding from what? A claim to secession
presupposes that one political entity or territory is a legitimate part of another
political territory. The court, therefore, needs a preliminary assessment of
the nature of the parent state’s relation to the claimant, as well as the nature
of the claimant entity. The latter investigation is not a determination per se
of whether the claimant constitutes a state under international law. Rather, it
is a determination of whether the claimant is state-like—that is, whether it
has the indices of a state.23 If it does not, then there is no reason for the court
to go any further. Take a more extreme case: If an ethnic group scattered
throughout its parent state and not concentrated in any specific territory
claims independence, then the court should immediately dismiss the claim.
Biafra’s secession claim, as shown below, brought this issue into bold
relief.24
The history of the Former Yugoslavia illustrates the importance of these
relational factors. The relational status of Slovenia, Croatia, and BosniaHerzegovina within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY)
proved critical in assessing the legal viability of their independence claims.
The Badinter Arbitration Commission deemed it important that these
political entities were lawfully recognized republics within the SFRY.25 This
put their independence claims within a dissolution context rather than within
a secession context. Since by July 1992 the SFRY did not exist, then there
was nothing for these republics to secede from.26 Unsurprisingly, these
republics did not secede. Instead, the parent state dissolved. However, this
convenient analysis creates problems. Perhaps the cases of Slovenia and
Macedonia qualify as dissolutions, since the SFRY eventually acquiesced in
their declarations of independence;27 but the same cannot be said of the
independence moves by Croatia and, of course, Bosnia-Herzegovina because
the SFRY did not exist at the time of their declarations.28
23
The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States sets out the criteria for
statehood: “a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity
to enter into relations with other states.” Convention on Rights and Duties of States art. 1,
Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19.
24
See infra Part II.C.1.c.
25
Conference on Yugoslavia, Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 1, 92 I.L.R. 162, 164–
46 (1991) [hereinafter Badinter Opinion].
26
See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 400 (2d ed.
2006) (noting that the Badinter Opinion found that the SFRY no longer existed).
27
Badinter Opinion, supra note 25, at 165.
28
See John Dugard & David Raič, The Role of Recognition in the Law and Practice of
Secession, in SECESSION: INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVES 94, 123–32 (Marcelo G. Kohen
ed., 2006) (discussing Croatia’s and Bosnia-Herzegovina’s secessionist claims).
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How does Kosovo fit into the Badinter Commission’s analysis? James
Crawford, a leading international law jurist, and many other commentators
give an incomplete account of Kosovo when they describe it only as having
been “an autonomous region within the Republic of Serbia.”29 More
accurately, Kosovo was an autonomous region existing not only within
Serbia, but also, crucially, within the SFRY.30 In other words, the critical
fact of Kosovo’s status was that it was a part of the entire SFRY, not simply
that Serbia had some legal and administrative control over it.31 Crawford
omits the crucial fact that Kosovo was an autonomous region within the
SFRY. In fact, Kosovo was in many respects independent of Serbia. It
participated in the federal governance of the SFRY and had considerable
autonomy to administer its own affairs.32 Recognizing Kosovo’s critical
relationship to the SFRY should have given Kosovo a strong case for
separation at the time of the Badinter Opinion. Kosovo’s legal status was
continuously determined within the framework of the SFRY.33 Kosovo’s
declaration of independence must relate to an entity from which it is seeking
independence. The fewer political and legal ties it has to the parent state, the
better its claim to independence.
What claims of sovereignty does the alleged parent state (Serbia) have
over the claimant (Kosovo)? According to some, the answer is “none.” For
example, legal analysts Jennifer Ober and Paul R. Williams, claim that
[f]rom 1963 to date, the only country that has had a legitimate
rule over Kosovo has been the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (SFRY) . . . . In light of the fact that Kosovo has
never been legally incorporated into the Republic of Serbia,

29

CRAWFORD, supra note 26, at 408.
HEIKE KRIEGER, THE KOSOVO CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN ANALYTICAL
DOCUMENTATION 1974–1999, at xxxi (2001).
31
Andreas Zimmermann & Carsten Stahn, Yugoslavia Territory, United Nations
Trusteeship or Sovereign State—Reflections on the Current and Future Status of Kosovo, 70
NORDIC J. INT’L L. 423, 425 (2001) (“Until the dismemberment of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in 1992, Kosovo was technically an autonomous province
within the province of Serbia.”).
32
See generally TIM JUDAH, KOSOVO: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 42–54 (2008)
(discussing Kosovo in Yugoslavia).
33
Serbia’s legal status was amorphous from 1992 to 2000. However, what was clear was
that Serbia could not claim rights on behalf of the SFRY. Legality of Use of Force (Serb. and
Montenegro v. U.K.), Summary, 2004 I.C.J. 26 (Dec. 15) (“[The Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia’s] admission to the United Nations did not have, and could not have had, the
effect of dating back to the time when the SFRY broke up and disappeared.”).
30
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Serbia may make no claim to sovereignty over Kosovo, and
can make no claim of territorial integrity.34
However, a brief look at the history of the formation of the SFRY shows that
this also is not an entirely accurate portrayal.
During World War II, the communist leadership already had decided the
basic structure of Yugoslavia as a federation of six republics.35 It thought
that the two smaller regions, Kosovo and Vojvodina (an enclave within the
territory of Serbia with a significant minority population of Hungarians36),
were not ready to become republics.37 Kosovo and Vojvodina are different
than the other regions because each had a significant ethnic population
connected to another nation-state—Albania and Hungary, respectively. The
leaders even contemplated returning Kosovo to Albania.38 Montenegro and
Macedonia both made bids for Kosovo, but Serbia seemed like the natural
choice.39 In 1945, “the ‘People’s Assembly’ of Serbia . . . establish[ed] the
‘Autonomous Region of Kosovo-Metohija’, and declar[ed] that it was a
‘constituent part’ of Serbia.”40 In 1963, a new constitution made moderate
concessions to Kosovo’s autonomy, but Kosovo still remained under the
authority of Serbia.41 In fact, some commentators argue that, “[f]or the first
time, Kosovo’s constitutional status seemed to have been completely
eliminated at the federal level and made a mere function of the internal
arrangements of the republic of Serbia.”42
In 1974, all of that changed for Kosovo when Yugoslavia
constitutionalized the political gains that Kosovo made in its quest for
autonomy.43 The new federal constitution gave Kosovo considerable
autonomy, wherein it, along with Vojvodina, “became constituent
components of the SFRY, with direct representation and voting rights on the
major federal bodies, and were no longer subject to the legal jurisdiction of
34

Jennifer Ober & Paul R. Williams, Is It True That There Is No Right of SelfDetermination for Kosova?, in THE CASE FOR KOSOVA: PASSAGE TO INDEPENDENCE 109, 116
(Anna Di Lellio ed., 2006).
35
JOHN R. LAMPE, YUGOSLAVIA AS HISTORY 226 (1996).
36
Id. at 227.
37
Id. at 226.
38
JUDAH, supra note 32, at 31.
39
See NOEL MALCOLM, KOSOVO: A SHORT HISTORY 315 (1998) for a controversial but
lucid and scholarly account of Kosovo’s complex history.
40
Id. at 316.
41
See MARC WELLER, THE CRISIS IN KOSOVO 1989–1999, at 52–53 (1999) for an account of
Kosovo’s troubled years by a minority rights expert.
42
MALCOLM, supra note 39, at 324.
43
WELLER, supra note 41, at 54.
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the Republic of Serbia within which they were still nominally located.”44
Thus, the important issue is not, as thought by Crawford and similar
commentators, over Kosovo’s failure to achieve complete autonomy as a
republic; it is over the considerable degree of autonomy that Kosovo
managed to achieve.
What prevented Kosovo from achieving full status of a republic? “In
March 1989, with Kosova under emergency rule, both the Serbian parliament
and Kosova’s intimidated provincial assembly passed constitutional
amendments which restored Kosova to Serbian legal, political and economic
control.”45 In 1990, Serb authorities dissolved Kosovo’s government and
passed a new constitution that annulled Kosovo’s autonomous status.46 The
legality of Serbia’s actions should have been questioned. If the action of
reducing or revoking Kosovo’s autonomy is tantamount to changing borders,
then Milosovic’s moves violated Article 5 of the 1974 Constitution, requiring
consent of all constituent parts of the SFRY.47 Serbia’s legal authority to
revoke Kosovo’s autonomy is dubious, based on Article 301 of its
Constitution, which states: “enacting legislation for the entire territory of the
Serbian republic (i.e., including Vojvodina and Kosovo) [should be] on the
basis of mutual agreement of the assemblies of all three units.”48 However, it
is one thing to enact legislation and quite another to preempt the federal
constitution by completely revamping the political status of a region, whose
status depended on the federal grant. Even if we make the highly
questionable assumption that Serbia had the legal authority to revoke’s
Kosovo’s autonomy, that move violated Serbia’s constitutional amendment
XLVII section 2, adopted in 1989, which stated unequivocally that “the
‘position, rights and duties’ of the autonomous provinces regulated by the
federal constitution must not be altered by the Serbian Constitution.”49 Even
more importantly, the denial of previously granted internal self44

ROBERT BIDELEUX & IAN JEFFRIES, THE BALKANS: A POST-COMMUNIST HISTORY 529
(2007).
45
Id. at 532.
46
WELLER, supra note 41, at 59–64.
47
Peter Radan, Post-Secession International Borders: A Critical Analysis of the Opinions
of the Badinter Arbitration Commission, 24 MELB. UNIV. L. REV. 50, 66 (2000) (“A border of
the SFRY cannot be altered without the concurrence of all republics and autonomous
provinces.” (quoting CONST. (1974), art. 5, sec. 3 (Yugoslavia))).
48
PEDRO RAMET, NATIONALISM AND FEDERALISM IN YUGOSLAVIA, 1963–1983, at 82
(1984).
49
Joseph Marko, Kosovo—A Gordian Knot?, in GORDISCHER KNOTEN KOSOVO/A:
DURCHSCHLAGEN ODER ENTWIRREN? 261, 265 (Joseph Marko ed., 1999), quoted in Carsten
Stahn, Constitution without a State? Kosovo Under the United Nations Constitutional
Framework for Self-Government, 14 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 531, 533 n.10 (2001).
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determination within a state should have been and should be a matter of
international legal concern.50
In 1989, Slobodan Milosevic, then-President of the Socialist Republic of
Serbia, stripped Kosovo of the autonomy status it attained under Josip Broz
Tito, Yugoslavia’s first president, from 1953 to 1974.51 Two organizations,
the Association of Philosophers and Sociologists of Kosovo and the Writers
Association of Kosovo, took the lead in establishing an underground civil
society for Albanian Kosovars.52 Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, an aesthetician and
literary historian, president of the Writers Association, became the leader of
the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK).53 Beginning in 1991, the LDK
led a pacifist movement for an independent and sovereign Kosovo.54 No one
listened to the peaceful pleas of Kosovo’s leaders, and the 1995 Dayton
Peace Accords also ignored Kosovo.55 In 1995 and 1996, sporadic terrorist
acts took place.56 In 1997, the Kosovo Liberation Army, impatient with
Rugova’s non-violent secessionist pleas, appeared again.57 Unfortunately for
law and morality, the rest is history. In 1999, NATO began a three month
bombing campaign against the Former Republic of Yugoslavia.
Given these historical developments, then, any claims that Serbia had on
Kosovo were dependent on the respective parties’ relationships within the
SFRY. Once the SFRY dissolved, then the juridical relationship between
Serbia and Kosovo dissolved or, minimally, it should have brought that
relationship into question. After all, Serbia, despite its protestations to the
contrary, did not qualify as the successor state to the SFRY.58 Serbia did not
have a right to give autonomy to Kosovo nor did it have a right to take it
away.
50

See infra Part II.D.
BIDELEUX & JEFFRIES, supra note 44, at 532.
52
HOWARD CLARK, CIVIL RESISTANCE IN KOSOVO 54–55 (2000).
53
JUDAH, supra note 32, at 72.
54
Id. at 70–71.
55
See generally General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Bosn. & Herz.-Croat.-Yugo., Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 75, 89; Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Essay,
The Fractured Soul of the Dayton Peace Agreement: A Legal Analysis, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L.
957 (1998) (attempting to understand the shortcomings of the Dayton Peace Agreement);
David L. Phillips, Comprehensive Peace in the Balkans: The Kosovo Question, 18 HUM. RTS.
Q. 821, 821 (1996) (criticizing the omission of Kosovo from the Dayton Peace Agreement).
56
See BIDELEUX & JEFFRIES, supra note 44, at 537.
57
Id.
58
The UN Security Council and the General Assembly rejected the Former Republic of
Yugoslavia’s claim that it was identical with the former SFRY. S.C. Res. 777, para. 1, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/777 (Sept. 19, 1992); G.A. Res. 47/1, para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/1 (Sept. 19,
1992).
51
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There are advantages in beginning the inquiry with questions about the
territorial status of the seceding claimant, for this may be the easiest issue for
the court to assess since it only needs to examine the political history of the
claimant. Underlying the court’s analysis should be an assessment as to how
state-like the claimant is. Kosovo has little trouble getting over this
threshold. While Kosovo has experienced considerable growing pains over
the past decade, it certainly now looks and acts like a state. For example,
except for some disputed boundaries, it has effective control over specifiable
territory.59 As shown in the analysis below, the nature of the claimant might
prove negatively determinative, as was the case of Biafra’s unsuccessful
secessionist claims beginning in 1966.60 Further, the analysis focuses on the
Kosovo territory and not on the Kosovo people. In many analyses, “people”
trumps “territory.”61 The approach below, in contrast, avoids the nearly
impossible task and entanglement of figuring out what kind of people there
are in the territory in question. Are Kosovars colonial peoples? Are
Kosovar Albanians an ethnic group? Fortunately, those questions can and
should remain unanswered.
Despite not having to determine what kind of people exist in Kosovo, one
difficulty remains.
Whatever the legitimacy of Kosovo’s claim to
independence in the early 1990s, that is no longer the issue. Kosovo’s status
as a political entity remains in legal limbo—the characterization of Kosovo’s
juridical status between 1990 and the present remains unsettled.62
Unfortunately, Kosovo accepted what should have been seen as its
questionable relationship to Serbia. Still, it is worth thinking about what
could and should have been done.

59
See Andreas Ernst, Fuzzy Governance: State-Building in Kosovo Since 1999 as
Interaction Between International and Local Actors, 7 DEMOCRACY & SECURITY 123, 125–26
(2011) (claiming that fuzzy governance resulted from the internationals and locals having
different goals in state-building in Kosovo).
60
See infra Part II.C.1.c.
61
See, e.g., ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES 109–25 (1995) (tracing
the history of the principle of self-determination as applied to colonial peoples).
62
See Richard Falk, The Kosovo Advisory Opinion: Conflict Resolution and Precedent, 105
AM. J. INT’L L. 50, 55–56 (2011) (“[Serbia] had clearly lost the advisory opinion battle,
although not completely, as the majority never affirmed the independence of Kosovo or the
current suitability of Kosovo for membership in the United Nations and other international
institutions, or even whether Kosovo was entitled to diplomatic relations owing to its claimed
status as a sovereign state.”).
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1. Case Studies
Comparisons of Kosovo to other related cases, namely the Baltic States,
Chechnya, and Biafra, bring together various strands of the analysis thus far.
The case studies below will show just how the Kosovo case stands out. First,
the case of the Baltic States is one of unjust annexation, not secession.
Second, the relationship between Russia and Chechnya is clearer than that
between Serbia and Kosovo in that Russia was a successor state to the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), whereas Serbia was not a successor
state to the SFRY. Finally, unlike Biafra, Kosovo has the indices of
statehood.
a. Baltic States
The establishment of the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) as
independent states when the USSR collapsed constituted a case of a
restoration of states. The USSR unjustly denied their previous independent
status when it annexed them in 1940.63 Although the Baltic States
experienced some positive changes as parts of the USSR, those changes
could not “alter the fact that the Baltic people have historically been, and
continue to be, subjugated, dominated, and exploited.”64 For example, from
the middle to the late 1940s, the USSR deported roughly 600,000 Balts (out
of a total population of 6 million) to Siberia and elsewhere.65 Overt
oppression allegedly ended in 1952.66
In the 1990s, did the Baltic States, have what international law should
recognize as a right to secession?67 No. These were cases of unjust
annexation, which must not be confused with secession. An unjust
annexation is a ground for a previously independent state to seek
independence from its annexing state.68 Annexation is a restorative right, not
63
The USSR illegally annexed the Baltic States—all independent before the 1940
annexure. CRAWFORD, supra note 26, at 393.
64
William C. Allison V, Comment, Self-Determination and Recent Developments in the
Baltic States, 19 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 625, 629 (1990–1991).
65
ALEXANDER R. ALEXIEV, DISSENT AND NATIONALISM IN THE SOVIET BALTIC 3–6 (1983);
see also Susan E. Himmer, The Achievement of Independence in the Baltic States and Its
Justifications, 6 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 253, 265 (1992) (describing the “[t]housands” of
deportations).
66
ALEXIEV, supra note 65, at 6.
67
According to Article 72 of the 1977 Constitution of the USSR, “[e]ach Union Republic
shall retain the right freely to secede from the USSR.” KONSTITUTSIIA SSSR art. 72 (1977)
[KONST. SSSR] [USSR CONSTITUTION].
68
CRAWFORD, supra note 26, at 394.
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a remedial one;69 it restores the status quo ante. The Baltic States’ unjust
annexation is different from the events in Kosovo; Serbia’s takeover of
Kosovo did not constitute an unjust annexation, since Kosovo was not an
independent state before Serbia’s effective occupation of Kosovo.
b. Chechnya
Chechnya poses a case closer to that of Kosovo, but there are also critical
differences. While Kosovo’s status became questionable with the dissolution
of the SFRY, the same cannot be said of Chechnya with the dissolution of
the USSR. The international community recognized Russia as a successor
state to the USSR, which, in turn, was a successor to the Russian Empire.70
So, whatever the concerns over the treatment of Chechnya by Russia (and the
USSR), Chechnya’s juridical status is not contested, certainly not to the
degree that Kosovo’s status became problematic with the dissolution of the
parent state, the SFRY.71 At this stage of the inquiry, the problem of
Russia’s abrogation of its 1996 treaty that envisaged an independent
Chechnya need not be addressed.72
c. Biafra
A territory needs the basic characteristics of a state in order to make a
successful case for secession.73 The secession attempt by Biafra will serve as
a case study throughout this Article to provide continuity. For many reasons,
Biafra did not have these indices of a state. “Although Biafra had a
government,”74 Biafra neither had, nor did it make any attempts to establish,
an effective government. Oversimplifying the events that preceded Biafra’s
69
But see ALLEN BUCHANAN, SECESSION: THE MORALITY OF POLITICAL DIVORCE FROM
FORT SUMTER TO LITHUANIA AND QUEBEC 11 (1991), mistakenly treating annexation as a
restorative right not as a remedial one. He should decouple unjust annexation from secession;
they are two entirely different matters.
70
CRAWFORD, supra note 26, at 395.
71
See Thomas D. Grant, A Panel of Experts for Chechnya: Purposes and Prospects in
Light of International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 115, 117 (1999) (“[N]o state to date has
recognized Chechnya.”).
72
Khasavyourt Joint Declaration and Principles for Mutual Relations, Russ.-Chechnya,
Aug. 31, 1996, available at http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/cds/agreements/pdf/rus6.pdf
(referring to “the universally recognised right of peoples to self-determination” and providing
for a mutual agreement to be reached by December 31, 2001).
73
See supra note 23 (setting out the criteria for statehood).
74
David A. Ijalaye, Note and Comment, Was “Biafra” at Any Time a State in International
Law?, 65 AM. J. INT’L L. 551, 553 (1971).
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ill-fated attempt at secession, there were electoral irregularities, followed by
a national coup led by a military faction largely of Eastern Ibo origin, and a
counter-coup, staged by Northern military officers.75 During that critical
period, Biafra hardly had a history as a territory that sought some form of
democratic autonomy.76
More controversial—and perhaps less telling but nonetheless relevant—is
the absence of other key characteristics of a nascent state, namely, a
permanent population and a defined territory.77 While it had a permanent
population, many of Biafra’s population group most relevant to the
secessionist claim—the Ibo—resided in areas outside Biafra.78 In fact, “[i]t
was not all that clear whether the Biafrans sought independence from Nigeria
for the former Eastern Region or for the Ibos . . . who were scattered in other
regions of Nigeria.”79
D. Internal Self-Determination
The second stage of the inquiry proves most crucial when examining
Kosovo’s claims. At this stage, the court should make substantive
assessments of the claimant’s status, including its relation to the parent state.
The assessment has two distinct phases. First, the court should examine the
status of the claimant with regards to internal self-determination. Second,
the court should probe for harms perpetrated against the claimant by the
parent state. The next section sets forth the legal grounds for internal selfdetermination—its basis in treaties, customary law, and judicial opinions.
The subsequent sections establish a basis in international law for addressing
certain kinds of harms, specifically those that violate peremptory norms.
1. International Law and Internal Self-Determination
Hurst Hannum claimed that “the internal aspect of the right of selfdetermination is the most important aspect of the right in the late twentieth
75

M.G. Kaladharan Nayar, Self-Determination Beyond the Colonial Context: Biafra in
Retrospect, 10 TEX. INT’L L.J. 321, 322–23 (1975); see also LARRY DIAMOND, CLASS,
ETHNICITY AND DEMOCRACY IN NIGERIA: THE FAILURE OF THE FIRST REPUBLIC 266–72 (1988)
(using Nigeria as a case study to establish the general conditions for a stable democracy
among developing countries).
76
Ijalaye, supra note 74, at 553.
77
Id.
78
M. Rafiqul Islam, Secessionist Self-Determination: Some Lessons from Katanga, Biafra
and Bangladesh, 22 J. PEACE RES. 211, 214 (1985).
79
Id.

120

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 40:105

century.”80 The same is true in the twenty-first century as well. For
example, Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter provides, “All Members shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”81 However,
self-determination, at first, took a legal backseat to the right to territorial
integrity because states successfully promoted the idea that sovereignty
constituted the linchpin of the international legal order.82 That is no longer
the case because human rights and the rule of law no longer lie solely within
the jurisdiction of states. Indeed, as the following survey of various sources
of international law demonstrates, international law supports internal selfdetermination.
a. Treaties
The U.N. Charter contains two references to self-determination: Articles
1(2) and 55.83 More explicitly, Common Article 1 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights state:
1.

2.

3.

80

All peoples have the right of self-determination. By
virtue of that right they freely determine their political
status and freely pursue their economic, social and
cultural development.
All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of
their natural wealth and resources without prejudice
to any obligations arising out of international
economic co-operation, based upon the principle of
mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may
a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.
The State Parties to the present Covenant, including
those having responsibility for the administration of

Hurst Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 34 (1993).
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
82
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 580 (7th ed. 2008).
83
According to Article 1(2), a purpose of the United Nations is the development of
“friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples.” U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2; see id. art. 55 (“With a view to the
creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and
friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples . . . .”).
81
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Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall
promote the realization of the right of selfdetermination, and shall respect that right, in
conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the
United Nations.84
Jurists often either reject or indicate skepticism toward external selfdetermination and either support or speak favorably about internal selfdetermination.85 Crawford, one of the foremost experts on these issues,
interprets self-determination to refer to “the right of the people of a State to
choose its own form of government without external intervention.”86 He
infers that self-determination in the U.N. Charter could also mean the right of
a people within a territory “to choose their own form of government
irrespective of the wishes of the rest of the State of which that territory is a
part.”87 Given a choice, Crawford opts for the former meaning and finds
little or no support for the latter one;88 yet, he presents a false choice. He
conveniently ignores the language of Common Article 1, which clearly refers
to right of people to choose their own government within their State—a right
to internal self-determination. This right is not so much concerned with
external interference as with internal interference from a people’s own
government. How else can peoples “freely determine their political status”89
if not within a state? Crawford, however, does admit that the principle of
self-determination could apply to a territory like Kosovo.90 He coined the
term carence de souveraineté, meaning “entities part of a metropolitan State
84
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, para.1, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights art. 1, para. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
85
See, e.g., Johan D. van der Vyver, Self-Determination of the Peoples of Quebec Under
International Law, 10 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 12 (2000) (“The concept of external selfdetermination to denote secession, or depicting secession as ‘an offensive exercise of selfdetermination,’ is therefore a contradiction in terms.” (footnote omitted)); Reference re
Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, para. 126 (Can.) [hereinafter Quebec Secession]
(“The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to self-determination of a
people is normally fulfilled through internal self-determination . . . .”); Tamara Jaber, A Case
for Kosovo? Self-Determination and Secession in the 21st Century, 15 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 926
(2011) (concluding that “Kosovo cannot base its claim to statehood in a right to selfdetermination” because of the difficulties of defining “peoples”).
86
See CRAWFORD, supra note 26, at 114 (noting that internal self-determination is only
implicitly referenced in the U.N. Charter).
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
ICCPR, supra note 84, art. 1, para. 1; ICESCR, supra note 84, art. 1, para. 1.
90
CRAWFORD, supra note 26, at 126.
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but that have been governed in such a way as to make them in effect nonself-governing territories.”91 For Crawford, this is, at best, a principle and
not a right.92 The subjects of rights are clearly defined in law, whereas those
of principles are still an admixture of law and politics.93
Self-determination became embedded in international law in 1960 with
the passage of the U.N. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples.94 According to the declaration, all peoples
under colonial rule have the right to “freely determine their political
status.”95 This right, however, has been interpreted narrowly in its
application to colonial peoples.96 Documents, such as the 1970 U.N. General
Assembly Resolution entitled “Declaration on Principles of International
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations” (Declaration on Friendly
Relations),97 indicate a willingness of the international community to extend
the idea of peoples beyond the colonial context.98 The Declaration on
Friendly Relations has been found to reflect customary international law.99
The so-called safeguard clause in the Declaration on Friendly Relations
provides one legal argument for a remedial right of secession. The argument
is that although the Declaration on Friendly Relations does not explicitly
grant a right to secession, it does infer such a right. The Declaration on
Friendly Relations states that “[t]he establishment of a sovereign and
independent State . . . or the emergence into any other political status freely
determined by a people constitute modes of implementing the right of selfdetermination by that people.”100 This language clearly suggests a right to

91

Id.
Id. at 126–27.
93
Id.
94
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A.
Res. 1514 (XV), U.N. Doc. A/4684 (Dec. 14, 1960).
95
Id. para. 2.
96
G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), Annex, princ. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1541(XV) (Dec. 15, 1960)
(“Chapter XI [of the U.N. Charter, Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories]
should be applicable to territories which were then known to be of the colonial type.”).
97
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res.
2625(XXV), U.N. Doc. A/8082 (Oct. 24, 1970) [hereinafter Declaration on Friendly
Relations].
98
CRAWFORD, supra note 26, at 118–21.
99
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, paras. 191, 193 (June 27) (applying the principles of the Declaration on Friendly
Relations).
100
Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 97, at 124.
92
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internal self-determination. Similarly, the Helsinki Final Act states that “all
peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to determine . . . their internal
and external political status.”101 Moreover, the saving clause in the
Declaration on Friendly Relations reaffirms the principle of territorial
integrity:
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as
authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember
or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political
unity of sovereign and independent States conducting
themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples as described above and thus
possessed of a government representing the whole people
belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed
or colour.102
Thus, presumably, territorial integrity remains intact as long as the State
does not oppress a segment of its peoples. If the State does violate the rights
of some of its peoples, then those people would have a claim to impair
territorial integrity by secession. However, “the language of the saving
clause seems to limit any possible entitlement to secede to racial and
religious groups.”103 Finally, commentaries to CERD104 and to the ICCPR105
confirm the right to internal self-determination. In addition, there are the
1975 Helsinki Final Act,106 the 1981 African Charter on Human Rights,107
and the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme for Action.108
101

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Final Act art. 1(a)(VIII), Aug. 1,
1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292 [hereinafter Helsinki Final Act].
102
Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 97, at 124.
103
Daniel Fierstein, Note, Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence: An Incident Analysis of
Legality, Policy and Future Implications, 26 B.U. INT’L L.J. 417, 429 n.87 (2008).
104
Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation No. 21,
Right of Self-Determination, para. 4, U.N. Doc. CERD/48/Misc.7/Rev.3 (Aug. 23, 1996). The
Committee forged a link between the right to self-determination and “the right of every citizen
to take part in the conduct of public affairs at any level.” Id.
105
Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 12, Article 1 (Right to SelfDetermination), paras. 1–3, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (Mar. 13, 1994). By virtue of the
right to self-determination, peoples have the right to “freely determine their political status”
and to enjoy the right to choose the form of their constitution or government. The HRC found
the right of citizens to participate directly in public affairs, guaranteed by Article 25 of the
ICCPR, distinct but closely linked to the right to self-determination. Id. para. 2.
106
Helsinki Final Act, supra note 101, art. 1(a)(VIII). The Helsinki Final Act placed
“additional constitutional judicial obligations” on the Soviet Union. Boris Meissner, The
Right of Self-Determination After Helsinki and Its Significance for the Baltic Nations, 13 CASE
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b. Customary Law
The exact nature of internal self-determination remains controversial, and
whether there is a positive right in international law to internal selfdetermination may be disputed. However, there are an increasing number of
international documents making direct or indirect reference to democracy,
which seems to lie at the heart of internal self-determination.109 More
importantly for this Article’s argument, international law clearly condemns
the taking away of internal self-determination after it has been granted. The
U.N. has condemned regimes that blatantly deny a significant portion of its
population internal self-determination.110 By examining the U.N. resolutions
and legal opinions in the following cases, as well as the treaty and
declaration provisions cited above,111 it is clear that the principle of internal
self-determination has become customary law not only in decolonialization
cases,112 but also in other cases—those concerning Rhodesia, South Africa,
East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Haiti.

W. RES. J. INT’L L. 375, 383 (1981).
107
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 20, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S.
217. Perhaps, the African Charter extends, on a regional level, the right of political selfdetermination to the right of economic self-determination. See Richard N. Kiwanuka, Note
and Comment, The Meaning of “People” in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 80, 95–99 (1988) (attempting to clarify the meaning of “peoples” in
the African Charter).
108
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, para. 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July
12, 1993) [hereinafter Vienna Declaration]. The Vienna Declaration extended the Declaration
on Friendly Relations’ from application to “a government representing the whole people
belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour” to application to “a
Government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction of
any kind.” Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 97, at 124 (emphasis added); Vienna
Declaration, supra, para. 2 (emphasis added); see also Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Comment, The
Degrees of Self-Determination in the United Nations Era, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 304, 306 (1994)
(“Thus, the disclaimer referred to a government representing the whole people belonging to
the territory without distinction as to race, creed or color.”).
109
For example, 166 countries are parties to the ICCPR, supra note 84, with its Article 25 that
guarantees a right to free elections and participation in public affairs. Status of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION (Nov. 28, 2011, 07:05:56
EDT), http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=
4&lang=en.
110
See, e.g., infra note 114 and accompanying text.
111
See supra Part II.D.1.a.
112
Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 121 (Oct. 16) (separate opinion of
Judge Dillard) (“The pronouncements of the Court thus indicate, in my view, that a norm of
international law has emerged applicable to the decolonization of those non-self-governing
territories which are under the aegis of the United Nations.”).
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In 1965, Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith, leading the whites that
made up only 6% of the population, unilaterally declared Rhodesia
independent from the United Kingdom.113 Later that year, the U.N. General
Assembly passed a resolution that condemned the perpetuation of minority
rule as “incompatible with the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination.”114 This was followed by a Security Council resolution,
which was “the most recent expression of a general community concern to
preserve that right [of self-determination] for [the people of Rhodesia].”115
The Security Council condemned the government of Rhodesia and called
upon the United Kingdom to restore internal self-determination.116 It then
adopted sanctions against the regime.117
The disenfranchisement of colored voters has a long, ignoble history in
South Africa.118 The British colonial rulers severely limited the black
franchise.119 However, after independent South Africa’s 1948 elections,
apartheid became fully entrenched and institutionalized.120 It was only after
the Sharpeville massacre in 1966 that the Security Council began to take
action against the apartheid regime—for example, by imposing sanctions on
it.121 For purposes of this analysis, the most important thing to note is that
the U.N.’s condemnation of South Africa’s racism tied integrally to the
South African government’s denial of internal self-determination.122
113

Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, Rhodesia and the United Nations: The
Lawfulness of International Concern, 62 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (1968).
114
G.A. Res. 2012 (XX), para. 2, U.N. Doc. A/2012(XX) (Oct. 12, 1965).
115
McDougal & Reisman, supra note 113, at 19.
116
S.C. Res. 217, paras. 1, 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/217 (Nov. 20, 1965). S.C. Resolution 217
called upon the United Kingdom “to take immediate measures in order to allow the people of
Southern Rhodesia to determine their own future.” Id. para. 7. S.C Resolution 232 reaffirmed
“the inalienable rights of the people of Southern Rhodesia to freedom and independence [from
minority rule].” S.C. Res. 232, para. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/232 (Dec. 16, 1966).
117
S.C. Res. 253, paras. 3–7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/253 (May 29, 1968).
118
See, e.g., NIGEL WORDEN, THE MAKING OF MODERN SOUTH AFRICA 55–57 (3d ed. 2000)
(discussing voting rights in South Africa and the connection to land ownership).
119
See LEONARD THOMPSON, A HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA 102 (1995) (describing the
means by which the British oppressed the Blacks of South Africa throughout its colonial rule).
120
See Martin Legassick, Legislation, Ideology and Economy in Post-1948 South Africa, 1 J.
S. AFR. STUD. 5, 5–6 (1974) (discussing the 1948 election and the victory of the nationalist
Party, which was the turning point for apartheid legislation and the “separate development”
ideology).
121
S.C. Res. 418, U.N. Doc. S/RES/418 (Nov. 4, 1977).
122
“The issues of racism and self-determination are related. . . . The South African system
is particularly obnoxious . . . because the majority of South Africa’s people are denied any
effective role in running the society in which they live. That is, they are denied the right of
self-determination.” United Kingdom Materials on International Law 1984, 1984 BRIT. Y.B.
INT’L L. 405, 431 (Geoffrey Marston ed.) (quoting U.K. representative R. Fursland, Statement
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The U.N. Security Council’s condemnation of the denial of internal selfdetermination has been extended to other cases as well. For example,
Roland Rich, a political scientist, talks about a developing “limited doctrine
of intervention in support of democratic entitlement.”123 He cites the
interventions in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Haiti—all endorsed by
Security Council resolutions—in support of this claim.124 Haiti was the first
case where the Security Council authorized force to restore democracy.125
Other cases were different. For example, the U.N. General Assembly and
the Security Council reaffirmed East Timor’s right to self-determination.126
These examples show that, while it may be difficult to make a case for a
right to internal self-determination in international law, an entirely different
situation arises when a state grants and then takes away internal selfdetermination from either its entire population or a part thereof.
c. Judicial Opinions
Opinions of the ICJ provide further support for this proposition. In the
Namibia Advisory Opinion, the ICJ held that “the subsequent development of
international law in regard to non-self-governing territories, as enshrined in
the Charter of the United Nations, made the principle of self-determination
applicable to all [nations].”127 At the time, South Africa administered
before the Third Committee of the General Assembly of the U.N. (Oct. 12, 1984)).
123
Roland Rich, Bringing Democracy into International Law, 12 J. DEMOCRACY, no. 3, 2001
at 20, 31; see also Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86
AM. J. INT’L L. 46, 85–91 (1992) (arguing that the international community can only invoke
collective enforcement measures against governments that oppress their peoples in limited
circumstances); James Crawford, Democracy and International Law 1993 BRIT. Y.B INT’L L.
113, 126–28 (discussing the problem with the idea that “democracy can be installed by the
unilateral assertion of external force” and how external forces must be careful when
attempting to intervene in order to establish a democracy because of the difficulties of
establishing legitimacy).
124
Rich, supra note 123, at 31. In the East Timor case, Resolution 1272 gave the U.N.
Transitional Administration the mandate to develop local democratic institutions. S.C. Res.
1272, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (Oct. 25, 1999). In the Sierra Leone case, Resolution 1132
demanded that the military junta “make way for the restoration of the democratically-elected
Government.” S.C. Res. 1132, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1132 (Oct. 8, 1997). Finally, in the
Haitian case, Resolution 940 explicitly stated that the goal of the international community was
“the restoration of democracy.” S.C. Res. 940, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (July 31, 1994).
125
S.C. Res. 940, supra note 124.
126
G.A. Res. 3485 (XXX), U.N. Doc. A/ 3485(XXX) (Dec. 12, 1975); S.C. Res. 384, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/384 (Dec. 22, 1975).
127
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South-West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory
Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, para. 52 (June 21).
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Namibia (former German South West Africa) by a mandate from the League
of Nations following World War I.128 Namibia’s white minority had sole
representation in South Africa’s whites-only Parliament.129 After World War
II, South Africa refused to place Namibia under a trusteeship, which would
have made it subject to closer international monitoring.130 This, of course, is
the same South Africa that institutionalized the racist system of apartheid
after World War II.131 The ICJ declared South Africa’s role in Namibia
illegal.132
The ICJ reaffirmed the principle of self-determination in the Western
Sahara Case.133 Judge Dillard’s separate opinion most strongly affirmed
internal self-determination: “It is for the people to determine the destiny of
the territory and not the territory the destiny of the people.”134 In fact, in the
Judge Castro’s separate opinion, he found the principles of selfdetermination as a peremptory norm in international law based on a series of
U.N. General Assembly resolutions and state practice of decolonization.135
At stake in all of these cases is not so much the right to internal selfdetermination as it is a right not to have internal self-determination
obliterated or unjustly denied once it has been granted.136 The ICJ in the
Kosovo Advisory Opinion could have found a right not to be denied internal
self-determination in international law within treaties, customary law, and
judicial opinions.137 It did, at least, find that Resolution 1244138 was to
establish institutions of self-government—“to establish, organize and oversee

128

Treaty of Versailles art. 119, June 28, 1919, 1919 U.S.T. Lexis 7, 2 Bevans 43.
THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA/NAMIBIA DISPUTE 83 (John Dugard ed., 1973).
130
G.A. Res. 65(I), U.N. Doc. A/65(I) (Dec. 14, 1946); G.A. Res. 9(I), U.N. Doc. A/9(I)
(Feb. 9, 1946); THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA/NAMIBIA DISPUTE, supra note 129, at 111–19
(describing the objectives of the trusteeship system).
131
JOHN ALLEN, APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA 106–07 (2005).
132
International Status of South West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 128, 144 (July
11).
133
The Court found that there were no valid claims by either Morocco or Mauritania of
territorial sovereignty over Western Sahara that would affect the self-determination of the
peoples of Western Sahara. Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16).
134
Id. at 122 (separate opinion of Judge Dillard).
135
Id. at 131–33 (separate opinion of Judge Castro).
136
MARC WELLER, CONTESTED STATEHOOD: KOSOVO’S STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE 10
(2009) (“[F]or it is often taken as axiomatic that autonomy cannot be unilaterally revoked by
the central government once it has been constitutionally established.”).
137
See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055,
T.S. No. 993 (listing the sources of international law the ICJ may use in settling disputes).
138
S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999).
129
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the development of local institutions of self-government in Kosovo under the
aegis of the interim international presence.”139
Most importantly, the focus on internal self-determination places the
incentives exactly where they should be placed. Full legal recognition of the
value and primacy of internal self-determination within the context of
debates and disputes over secession would serve as an incentive for potential
claimants to pursue all avenues of internal self-determination before making
any secessionist claims. In the same vein, it would be in the best interest of
the parent state to make as many concessions as feasible to demands for
internal self-determination in order to undermine any secessionist claims.
Jurists typically propose a final requirement on secession, namely, that
secession represents the last resort, when no other alternatives are
available.140 The Remedial Model’s requirement regarding internal selfdetermination incorporates the spirit of the exhaustion-of-remedies
formulations without accepting the pitfalls of adopting the letter of those
formulations. William Slomanson, a leading jurist, correctly points out the
lost opportunities to settle the conflict amicably between Serbia and
Kosovo.141 He bemoans Kosovo’s failure to cede some territory in northern
Kosovo in return for Serb territories to Kosovo.142 However, there will
always be room for pursuing more alternatives before taking a secession
route. The exhaustion of legal remedies is not the same as the exhaustion of
political remedies. What courts demand claimants do before pursuing a
claim further differs from what claimants can do themselves to resolve
disputes outside of the law. For example, Serbia can continue to hold out the
lure of autonomy measures for Kosovo. The issue is: at what point those
autonomy offers cease to be given legal effect. One answer is that they are
no longer legally binding when they have been offset by gross human rights
violations committed by the parent state against the claimant.143
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Kosovo Advisory Opinion, supra note 7, para. 98.
ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION 355 (2004);
CONTEXTUALIZING SECESSION 7 (Bruno Coppieters & Richard Sakwa eds., 2003); Michael P.
Scharf, Earned Sovereignty: Juridical Underpinnings, 31 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 373, 381
(2003).
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William R. Slomanson, Legitimacy of the Kosovo, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia Secessions:
Violations in Search of a Rule, 6 MISKOLC J. INT’L L. 1, 20–22 (2009).
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Id. at 20.
143
See infra Part II.E.
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2. Case Studies
A great deal of the opposition to Kosovo’s UDL has come from those
who fear that legally acknowledging Kosovo’s right to secession would set a
bad precedent.144 However, the internal self-determination factor actually
distinguishes Kosovo from a number of other cases.
a. Bosnian Serbs
The most relevant case to the situation in Kosovo is the Republika
Srpska, now a political entity within Bosnia-Herzegovina. The ICJ has cited
three situations in which the Security Council resolutions condemned
unilateral declarations of independence.145 The ICJ dismissed these as not
being determinative to the Kosovo Advisory Opinion because they apply
only to specific situations.146 However, a common concern can be gleaned
from these resolutions. The Security Council did not want unilateral
declarations of independence unduly and unjustifiably interfering with the
development of internal self-determination.147 Consider the cases concerning
the Bosnian Serbs and the Turkish Cypriots.148 With Resolution 787, the
Security Council condemned any threat of unilateral secession by any party
in Bosnia and Herzegovina while drafting an outline of a constitutional
structure to govern the region.149 Similarly, Security Council Resolution 541
condemned the attempt to establish the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
even before the international community had had a chance to broker a peace
deal that would include internal self-determination.150 These cases indicate
144

For example, a later case that may be affected by that type of acknowledgment is
Russia’s support for secession efforts by South Ossetia. See infra Part II.E.2.b.
145
Kosovo Advisory Opinion, supra note 7, para. 81 (noting “Security Council resolutions
216 (1965) and 217 (1965), concerning Southern Rhodesia; Security Council resolution 541
(1983), concerning northern Cyprus; and Security Council resolution 787 (1992), concerning
the Republika Srpska”).
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
For a discussion of similar Security Council Resolutions regarding Southern Rhodesia,
see text accompanying supra notes 115–16.
149
S.C. Res. 787, U.N. Doc. S/RES/787 (Nov. 16, 1992).
150
S.C. Res. 541, U.N. Doc. S/RES/541 (Nov. 18, 1983). The third periodic report of
Cyprus to the U.N. Human Rights Committee on Jan. 20, 1995 on the implementation of
ICCPR Article 1 (on the right of peoples to self-determination) states: “In Cyprus democratic
elections are held enabling its people to determine their political status and to pursue in a free
manner their economic, social and cultural development.” Human Rights Comm.,
Consideration of Reps. Submitted by States Parties Under Art. 40 of the Covenant, para. 42,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C94/Add.1 (Jan. 20, 1995). It discusses in some detail with presidential,
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that the international community would look very unfavorably on any
attempts by the Republika Srpska to follow Kosovo’s lead at declaring its
own independence because now it has a working constitutional structure
within which to operate and address its grievances. The Republika Srpska,
therefore, has a rather weak secessionist claim, in part, because it already has
considerable internal self-determination.
b. Biafra
Biafra poses interesting challenges to using the doctrine of internal selfdetermination as a factor in assessing secessionist claims. Was Biafra’s selfdetermination violated by the central government prior to its secessionist
claims? A brief foray into the history of Nigeria helps to answer that
question. In 1954, the British divided Nigeria into three somewhat
autonomous regions—Western Nigeria (dominated by the Yoruba), Eastern
Nigeria (dominated by the Ibo), and Northern Nigeria (dominated by the
Hausa/Fulani).151 The attempt of the Eastern Region to secede was not a
classical case of a thwarted attempt to attain internal self-determination.152
First, the situation was one of successive military coups at the federal and
regional levels.153 The war began with ethnic rivalry within the armed
forces154—hardly the makings of a democratic movement. Second, the
secessionist war was, in part, a conflict over different visions of the state.155
One vision held to the colonial construct of division into regions, whereas a
competing vision had Nigeria divided up into states.156 In other words, it is
difficult to see how efforts to achieve internal self-determination played a
pivotal role in the conflict. The secessionist movement of the Eastern
Region was not so much an attempt of one region to remove itself from the
whole but rather a competing vision of the nature of the whole. One
response to the continuing ethnic conflicts was to divide Nigeria into twelve
states; another, taken by the Eastern Region, was to secede.157
parliamentary and local elections.
151
See Tunga Lergo, Deconstructing Ethnic Politics: The Emergence of a Fourth Force in
Nigeria, 1 INT’L J. HUMAN. & SOC. SCI. 87, 89 (2011).
152
See Charles R. Nixon, Self-Determination: The Nigeria/Biafra Case, 24 WORLD POL.
473, 491 (1972) (arguing for the relevance of the concept of self-determination to
Nigeria/Biafra case).
153
Id. at 475.
154
Id. at 481.
155
Id. at 486.
156
Id. at 484.
157
Id. at 487.
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As demonstrated in this section, treaties, customary law, and judicial
opinions can be used to show that it is against international law to deny a
legitimate political entity the right to internal self-determination once it has
been granted. Thus, Serbia violated international law when it denied Kosovo
the right to internal self-determination granted to it by the SFRY.
E. Group Harms
The other aspect of the status inquiry that should be undertaken by the
court pertains to assessing the harms perpetrated against the claimant and its
people by the purported parent state. What harms would trigger a
secessionist claim? International law proscribes a set of harms as
peremptory norms (jus cogens)158 that are universally prohibited; even
sovereignty does not immunize any state from them.159 These harms
generally include genocide, slavery, grave breaches, torture, and (perhaps)
ethnic cleansing.160 Jurists have differed over the exact inventory of jus
cogens provisions. Oscar Schacther listed slavery, genocide, torture, mass
murder, prolonged arbitrary imprisonment, systematic racial discrimination,
and any other “gross violations of internationally recognized human
rights.”161 The commentary of the International Law Commission (ILC)
notes that some members suggested “trade in slaves, piracy or genocide” as
examples of jus cogens.162 The ILC gave illustrations rather than specific
examples so as not to impose its own interpretation. Other candidates
include the prohibition of “ ‘crimes against humanity,’ the non-refoulement
of refugees, [and] the illegality of unequal (or ‘leonine’) treaties.”163
158

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S 331 (“A
treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general
international law.”).
159
Mary Ellen Turpel & Philippe Sands, Peremptory International Law and Sovereignty:
Some Questions, 3 CONN. J. INT’L L. 364, 365 (1987–1988).
160
BROWNLIE, supra note 82, at 511.
161
OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 211 (1991).
162
Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, at 248, Jan. 3–28, 1966, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.1;
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 9 (1966). Except for the prohibition against force as contrary to
the U.N. Charter, the prohibition against genocide received the most votes (13 out of 26
delegates) as an example of jus cogens at the meetings of the Vienna Conference. Id. at 302;
see also JERZY SZTUCKI, JUS COGENS AND THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES
119–20 (1974) (tracing the theoretical history of jus cogens in international law). The ILC
gave illustrations rather than specific examples so as not to impose its own interpretation. See
RAFAEL NIETO-NAVIA, INTERNATIONAL PEREMPTORY NORMS (JUS COGENS) AND
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 15–16, available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/
WritingColumbiaEng.pdf.
163
Christopher A. Ford, Essay, Adjudicating Jus Cogens, 13 WIS. INT’L L.J. 145, 164–65
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Despite the disagreement over what to include on the list, few disagree
over the inclusion of genocide and slavery.164 The international community
already has made moral and legal progress by acknowledging the universal
status of these prohibitions.
Genocide did not become a codified
international crime until the ratification of the Genocide Convention.165
Today, two ad hoc international war crimes tribunals and a subsequently
established permanent one apply the preemptory prohibition against
genocide.166 Genocide qualifies as the worst group harm because there are
no viable justifications for it within any plausible moral system. Under some
carefully limited set of circumstances, there may be justification for other
types of mass killings, such as civilian war deaths, in some plausible—in the
sense that rational individuals may disagree about it—moral systems.
Killing individuals because of their perceived group affiliation, however, is
never morally defensible.167 Indeed, genocide qualifies as among the worst,
if not the worst, universally proscribed harms.
Within international law, the prohibition of derogation serves as a critical
test for a peremptory norm, and genocide easily passes the test. If states
cannot find any justifiable excuse for derogating from a norm, then the norm
qualifies as peremptory. Hannikainen analyzes derogation grounds that do
not serve as excuses for violating peremptory norms: “[d]erogation from
peremptory norms on the ground of necessity, emergency, reprisal, or selfdefense, all of them being situations which allow deliberation before the
action is taken, is not permitted.”168 None of these would qualify as an
excuse for violating the prohibition against genocide. If state officials have
the slightest time for reflection, that state has no excuse for choosing
genocide. Citing an emergency would not suffice as an excuse for
committing genocide.

(1994) (citation omitted).
164
Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State “Sovereignty,” 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 31, 39
(1995).
165
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
78 U.N.T.S. 277, 102 Stat. 3045.
166
Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, art. 8, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994); Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827, art. 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993); Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, 37 I.L.M. 1002.
167
See THOMAS W. SIMON, THE LAWS OF GENOCIDE: PRESCRIPTIONS FOR A JUST WORLD
(2007) (claiming that the crime of genocide is never justifiable or excusable).
168
LAURI HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS (JUS COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 265
(1988).
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It may seem that concerns about genocide have little to do with secession
issues. After all, the genocides that took place in Armenia, Germany, and
Rwanda did not involve any secessionist claims.169 Yet, other harms connect
to genocide. Some other harms qualify as peremptory prohibitions, in part,
due to their connection to genocide in that they have a probability of leading
to genocide. Ethnic cleansing, generally, is the “attempt[ ] to eliminate or
greatly reduce the size of an ethnic or national group in order to achieve
greater homogeneity within a territory.”170 Not all instances of ethnic
cleansing constitute genocide. However, forcibly moving mass numbers of
people from their homes often serves as a prelude to genocide, that is, to
killing of individuals because of their group affiliation. It follows that the
list of peremptory prohibitions relevant to the secessionist issue should
include ethnic cleansing since it has a genocidal form and has the potential of
leading to genocide.
The connection of group harms to genocide is twofold. First, lesser forms
of group harm can, and do, lead to genocide. Second, group harms have a
definitional element common to genocide: the infliction of harm on
individuals because of their perceived or actual group affiliation. Secession
claims made on the basis of group harm become matters of international
concern, in part, because of their actual and potential connections to a
universal prohibition against genocide. All of the harms cited thus far
contain a common ingredient: severe harms directed at individuals because
of their perceived or actual group affiliation. These prohibitions reflect an
international recognition that severe forms of pain and suffering inflicted
upon members of a group have a universal dimension and should not be
tolerated. To kill, enslave, torture, and uproot people because of their group
membership undermines any sense of international morality. The raison
d’être of a moral international order is to protect people from the worst
crimes.
One further category of harm is needed to complete the analysis: group
discriminatory harms. These include deprivations of basic needs—such as
food, clothing, housing, education, and employment—because of an
individual’s group affiliation.171 Discriminatory harms often link to the
harms prescribed in the peremptory norms of international law, but they form
169

See generally BENJAMIN A. VALENTINO, FINAL SOLUTIONS: MASS KILLING AND GENOCIDE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 152–95 (2004) (offering perspectives on ethnic killings in
Turkish Armenia, Nazi Germany, and Rwanda).
170
James W. Nickel, What’s Wrong with Ethnic Cleansing, J. SOC. PHIL., Mar. 1995, at 5, 6
(1995).
171
Thomas W. Simon, Group Harm, J. SOC. PHIL., Dec. 1995, at 123 (1995).
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a class distinct from genocide, ethnic cleansing, and the like. For the most
part, international law does not treat most discriminatory harms as
peremptory primarily because it does not regard discriminatory harms as
severe enough to warrant breaching the wall of sovereignty.172 A Remedial
Model for secession must attend to discriminatory harms, not because their
presence alone would justify secession, but because of the likelihood that
widespread and severe occurrences of discriminatory harms would lead to
the more severe forms of harm. The combination of actual, severe
discriminatory harms and the potential of genocide and its kin form a basis
for justifying secession within international law and global morality.
“Group harms” form a more specific category than “violations of human
rights.” Group harms make up those violations of human rights targeted
against members of a group because of their group affiliation.173 For
instance, China has widespread human rights violations directed at
dissidents,174 however, these violations do not constitute group harms since
they are not directed at a group primarily because of their group status,175
rather, they are, largely unjustly, aimed at individuals’ alleged actions or
statements.176 State power unleashed against dissidents does not—although,
under certain circumstances, it might—constitute status harms.177 Secession
constitutes a remedy for group, not individual, harm. However, secession
rights are remedial rights, invoked by a group under limited conditions to
rectify harms sustained by that group, not all citizens in general.178
The right to secession itself is not a peremptory norm but rather a remedy
of last resort.179 Peremptory norms, such as the universal prohibition against
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Hilary Charlesworth & Christine Chinkin, The Gender of Jus Cogens, 15 HUM. RTS. Q.
63, 68 (1993) (noting that jus cogens often includes systematic racial, but not gender,
discrimination).
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See generally THOMAS W. SIMON, ETHNIC IDENTITY AND MINORITY PROTECTION (2012)
(showing the primacy of group harm for minority protection).
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See generally Ann Kent, China’s Human Rights in ‘the Asian Century,’ in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN ASIA 187 (Thomas W.D. Davis & Brian Galligan eds., 2011) (examining whether
China has moved from an Asian to an international perspective on human rights).
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To put it another way, dissidents do not constitute a disadvantaged group. For a fuller
development of this, see THOMAS W. SIMON, DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL INJUSTICE 71–108
(1995).
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NATAN LERNER, GROUP RIGHTS AND DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 31 (2d ed.
2003).
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Allen Buchanan, Democracy and Secession (June 16, 1997) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author).
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While jurists disagree over whether self-determination constitutes a peremptory norm, no
one to date has proposed that secession is a peremptory norm.
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genocide, transcend state boundaries.180 States do not have justifiable
grounds for violating these preemptory norms, but they have many justifiable
grounds for refusing secession. A state places itself on a moral high ground
when it resists the secession overtures of a group intent on creating a state
that would violate a high level peremptory norm, such as the prohibition
against genocide. Whether the right to self-determination is peremptory
proves more complicated.181 If it includes an unseverable right of secession,
then the arguments above would disqualify it as a peremptory norm. If we
can separate a right to self-determination from a right of secession, then the
analysis becomes more complicated.
If we apply this analysis to Kosovo, we find that answers to questions
about Kosovo’s status provide ample grounds for why the ICJ should not
have taken Resolution 1244 as determinative. If Serbia’s claim over Kosovo
is questionable, if Serbia has been responsible for the denial of Kosovo’s
internal self-determination, and if Serbia has been responsible for harms
perpetrated against Kosovo that border on peremptory prohibitions, then it is
difficult to interpret Resolution 1244 as in any way mandating the eventual
return of Kosovo to Serbia’s control.182 Finally, it was not simply Serbia’s
revocation of Kosovo’s autonomy that made the case for secession; it was
also the repeated harms perpetrated by Serbia on the people of Kosovo.
Once this harm element is factored in, the burden is shifted from the claimant
on having attempted to effect internal self-determination. This would then
excuse Kosovo’s refusals to take up Serbia’s autonomy offers, assuming that
they were made in good faith, after Kosovo effectively became a U.N.
protectorate.

180
M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, 59
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 71 (1996) (noting “that the prohibition against genocide is a jus
cogens norm that cannot be reserved or derogated from”).
181
See A. Mark Weisburd, The Emptiness of the Concept of Jus Cogens, as Illustrated by the
War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 17 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 24 (1995) (“[T]here is authority both for
and against the proposition that the list of jus cogens norms includes the right of selfdetermination.”).
182
Resolution 1244 uses the following language: “Reaffirming the commitment of all
Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia . . . .” S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 138. However, the reference to territorial
integrity is found only in the preamble of the resolution and not in the its operative body. Id.
Further, the resolution and annexes seem to envision an interim, and not a final settlement.
See Weller, supra note 1, at 140 (“[T]hey are not focused on final status negotiations, but
instead establish a limitation for an interim settlement in advance of a determination of final
status . . . .”).
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1. Case Studies
a. Quebec
In 1998, the Supreme Court of Canada issued an important decision
concerning the right of Quebec to secede.183 The court stated:
In summary, the international law right to self-determination
only generates, at best, a right to external self-determination in
situations of former colonies; where a people is oppressed, as
for example under foreign military occupation; or where a
definable group is denied meaningful access to government to
pursue their political, economic, social and cultural
development.184
The court found that none of these conditions applied to the Quebec
people.185 The people of Quebec do not qualify as colonial peoples.186
Moreover, Quebec had not been denied internal self-determination, and the
people of Quebec had not suffered oppression.187
The court’s formulation comes close to the Remedial Model, but the latter
condition offers greater clarity on a number of points. The court seemed to
see the forces of oppression as external and not internal.188 The court
characterized the second condition as “where a people is subject to alien
subjugation, domination or exploitation outside a colonial context.”189
However, in its summary, the court used alien or foreign subjugation as an
example and not as a defining characteristic.190 More importantly, the court
glossed over a critical ingredient in most secession cases: internal
oppression, particularly where the people are “the victim of attacks on its
physical existence or integrity, or of a massive violation of its fundamental
rights.”191 Given that the court used this internal oppression standard to
evaluate whether the people of Quebec are oppressed, it stands to reason that
the failure to include internal oppression was an unfortunate oversight.
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191

Quebec Secession, supra note 85.
Id. para. 138.
Id. para. 154.
Id.
Id.
Id. para. 131.
Id. para. 133 (emphasis added).
Id. para. 154.
Id. para. 135.
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Finally, while the court duly acknowledged the importance to a secession
claim of denying internal self-determination,192 it failed to link that factor to
oppression.
The ICJ considered the question addressed in the Quebec Secession case
to be significantly different from the one posed in the Kosovo case.193 The
question faced by the Supreme Court of Canada was the following:
Does international law give the National Assembly,
legislature or government of Quebec the right to effect the
secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally? In this regard,
is there a right to self-determination under international law
that would give the National Assembly, legislature or
government of Quebec the right to effect the secession of
Quebec from Canada unilaterally?194
If the issue was whether international law conferred an entitlement on
entities situated within a state unilaterally to break away from it, then not
only was the ICJ right to differentiate the question from the one it addressed,
but also to answer in the negative. A better formulation is to ask whether
international law prohibits the denial of internal self-determination. This
section has argued that it does. However, if that denial is not a peremptory
norm, then the claimant only has a weak case for secession, unless that denial
has been egregious and nearly absolute. On the other hand, if the denial of
internal self-determination combines with serious group harms, then the
claimant has a strong secessionist case.
b. Biafra
The Biafra case demonstrates the need for an international appraisal of
group harm. In May 1967, Biafra proclaimed secession from Nigeria,195
initiating a thirty-month civil war that cost many lives.196 Severe harms
directed at the Ibo preceded the secession demand. In July 1966, hundreds of
Ibo military officers and enlisted men were assassinated in retaliation for the
192

Id. para. 139.
Kosovo Advisory Opinion, supra note 7, paras. 55–56.
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Proclamation of the Republic of Biafra, May 30, 1967, 6 I.L.M. 665 (1967).
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592, 593 (1970); see also K.W.J. Post, Is There a Case for Biafra?, 44 INT’L AFF. 26, 29–30
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January 1966 coup of Ibo majors. September to October 1966 marked the
period of pogroms in northern Nigerian cities,197 resulting in the deaths of
5,000 to 50,000 Ibos and the displacement of between 700,000 and 2 million
Ibos.198
The Biafra leadership engaged in a concerted effort to convince the
international community that Biafrans were, and would continue to be,
victims of genocide at the hands of the Nigerians.199 Did Biafrans
experience severe group harms, actual and threatened, that mark a threshold
where secession becomes a justified demand? The multinational observer
team, invited by the Federal Government of Nigeria, found no evidence of
genocide,200 while the International Committee on the Investigation of
Crimes of Genocide in Paris brought forth dramatic depositions describing
mass killings of civilians.201 Although scholars generally agree with the
conclusion that the charge of genocide remains unsubstantiated, the Biafra
case illustrates the centrality of the issue of group harm in secession
claims.202
2. Cases Before and After Kosovo
Two cases loom large over the Kosovo case. Bangladesh is the first of
these because, of all the cases before the Kosovo case, it most clearly meets
the standards of remedial secession.203 Bangladesh does not stand as a legal
precedent for Kosovo since it clearly was not presented as a case of secession
at the time.204 However, it demonstrates a factual precedent—a kind of
situation where the international community should have recognized a legal
197

DAN JACOBS, THE BRUTALITY OF NATIONS 25 (1987).
JOHN J. STREMLAU, THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR, 1967–
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199
Id. at 113.
200
JACOBS, supra note 197, at 127.
201
Philip C. Aka, Prospects for Igbo Human Rights in Nigeria in the New Century, 48 HOW.
L.J. 165, 201 (2004) (“The Committee interviewed 1,082 people representing all of the actors
from the two sides to the civil war. Its finding, in the words of its principal investigator, Dr.
Mensah of Ghana, read: ‘Finally I am of the opinion that in many of the cases cited to me
hatred of the Biafrans (mainly Igbos) and a wish to exterminate them was a foremost
motivational factor.’ ” (citation omitted)).
202
This Article has not addressed the many who died of starvation due to the politics of
relief efforts. See JACOBS, supra note 197, at 108–10 (discussing starvation and relief efforts).
203
See Scharf, supra note 140, at 383 (“As for actual State practice, the existence of a right
to remedial secession is supported by the 1971 secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan . . . .”).
204
See CRAWFORD, supra note 26, at 415 (noting that only Bangladesh stands out as a clearcut historical example of a successful secession).
198
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right to secession. The second case, involving South Ossetia and Abkhazia,
does the opposite; it highlights a case very different from Kosovo’s claims.205
This is important because, politically, it is the case that might have proven
the most troublesome if Kosovo had been granted a remedial right to
secession. However, as discussed below, Kosovo’s case would not set a
worrisome precedent for South Ossetia or for similar claims.206
a. Bangladesh
The East Pakistan or Bangladesh case demonstrates a model case for what
a remedial right to secession should have looked like. The harms unfolded,
beginning with discrimination and ending with mass displacement of
people.207 After achieving independence from India in 1947 alongside West
Pakistan, the Bengali majority in East Pakistan experienced a wave of
internal colonialization at the hands of the non-Bengali-speaking West
Pakistanis.208 For example, Pakistani elite launched a campaign to impose
Urdu, on the East Pakistanis.209 Bengalis were poorly represented in the
military and the civil service.210 Also, even though the East received more
money for economic development than the West between 1965 and 1970, the
West retained centralized control of the projects.211 Secession demands grew
in 1970 when West Pakistan helped to annul an election, in which the
Awami League received massive support for its autonomy proposals.212 As
80,000 Pakistani troops amassed to quell the secession movement, “[t]en
million refugees streamed across the Indian borders, the largest such
movement in a single time and place in history.”213 The Pakistani army
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reportedly killed millions of Bengalis, including many civilians.214 The U.N.
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities, meeting in 1971, hastily rejected requests from twenty-two
NGOs and the International Commission of Jurists to examine the
situation.215 The intervention of India in December 1971 led to the formation
of the new nation of Bangladesh.216 Perhaps if the East Pakistanis had an
international means of addressing discriminatory claims and autonomy
demands, the mass killings and displacements of individuals because of their
group status could have been abated.
East Pakistan clearly met the three conditions we have set forth for a
remedial right to secession. First, no one disputes the political division of
Pakistan into West and East and the relationship between these parts, thereby
passing217 the first test: Was East Pakistan a state-like territory that
represented its people and sought independence from a parent state, which
itself has a lawful claim on the claimant entity? Indeed, East Pakistan was a
recognized and legitimate part of West Pakistan.218 Second, did the claimant
attempt to exercise internal self-determination and did the parent state
seriously thwart those efforts? West Pakistan clearly denied East Pakistan’s
attempts to establish internal self-determination by annulling elections.
Third, did the claimant suffer or was it threatened with harms that rose to the
level of peremptory prohibitions? West Pakistan committed crimes against
East Pakistan that constituted violations of peremptory norms.219 While
there are dangers in using one factual situation as a model, overall the more a
situation resembles the plight of East Pakistan, the stronger its case for
secession.
214
SARMILA BOSE, DEAD RECKONING: MEMORIES OF THE 1971 BANGLADESH WAR 176
(2011) (“ ‘Between one and three million people were reportedly killed . . . .’ ” (citation
omitted)).
215
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm’n on Prevention of
Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, July 23, 1971, 24th Sess., U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/NGO.46; Ved P. Nanda, A Critique of the United Nations Inaction in the
Bangladesh Crisis, 49 DENV. L.J. 53, 57–58 (1972–1973).
216
M. Rashiduzzaman, Changing Political Patterns in Bangladesh: Internal Constraints
and External Fears, 17 ASIAN SURVEY 793, 794 (1977).
217
Background Note: Pakistan, U.S. DEP’T STATE, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3453.
htm (last visited Dec. 27, 2011).
218
Id.
219
A 1972 report concluded that the “killing ‘was done on a scale which was difficult to
comprehend.’ ” NICHOLAS J. WHEELER, SAVING STRANGERS: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 57 (2000) (citing Secretariat of the International Commission of
Jurists, The Events in East Pakistan: A Legal Study, in REVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMISSION OF JURISTS 8, 26 (1972)).
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b. South Ossetia and Abkhazia
Both South Ossetia and Abkhazia were autonomous regions within the
USSR and semi-autonomous within the former Soviet Republic of
Georgia.220 This political geography mirrors the status of Kosovo with the
SFRY and Serbia. After the breakup of the USSR, both regions experienced
civil wars with their parent state of Georgia, as well as periodic interventions
and current occupations by Russia, which saw itself as a peacemaker in the
region.221 Both regions have become “effectively separated from the rest of
Georgia.”222 The following three questions need to be posed to determine
the legitimacy of the secessionist claims of South Ossetia and Abkhazia:
1.
2.
3.

Did Georgia have legitimate legal authority over
South Ossetia and Abkhazia?
Has Georgia seriously stifled autonomy measures and
other attempts at internal self-determination by South
Ossetia and Abkhazia?
Has Georgia committed crimes that violate
peremptory norms against South Ossetia and
Abkhazia?

Unlike Serbia’s current claim over Kosovo, Georgia has legitimate legal
authority over South Ossetia and Abkhazia. South Ossetia is an autonomous
administrative district, and Abkhazia is an autonomous republic within
Georgia.223 While everyone thinks that atrocities have been committed on all
sides, most analysts agree that Georgia’s actions have not risen to the level of
committing violation of peremptory norms.224 However, the most critical
220
Edward Ozhiganov, The Republic of Georgia: Conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in
MANAGING CONFLICT IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION 341, 347, 350 (Alexei Arbatov et al. eds.,
1997).
221
Christopher J. Borgen, The Language of Law and the Practice of Politics: Great Powers
and the Rhetoric of Self-Determination in the Cases of Kosovo and South Ossetia, 10 CHI. J.
INT’L L. 1, 5 (2009).
222
Id.
223
Gerard Toal, Russia’s Kosovo: A Critical Geopolitics of the August 2008 War over South
Ossetia, 49 EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY & ECON. 670, 670 (2008).
224
The parties have all charged each other with these grave violations. See Noelle M.
Shanahan Cutts, Note, Enemies Through the Gates: Russian Violations of International Law
in the Georgia/Abkhazia Conflict, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 281, 292 (2007–2008) (noting
Abkhazia did engage in ethnic cleansing of Georgians; that Georgians made up over 50% of
the Abkhazia’s population before 1992, while few remain today; and that tens of thousands of
South Ossetians have fled from Georgia’s incursions into its territory); Gregory Dubinsky,
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issue is autonomy.225
Georgia cannot have violated internal selfdetermination when there have been few attempts to implement it.
Admittedly, Georgia has stifled South Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s attempts at
external self-determination. For example, Georgia withdrew South Ossetia’s
autonomy status when, in 1990, South Ossetia declared independence.226
However, the focus should be on internal self-determination. In this case,
South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Georgia need to have demonstrated good faith
efforts at internal self-determination. This places the incentives exactly
where they should be: on the parties to attempt to broker autonomy
arrangements before any full-fledged secessionist claims are entertained.
If the party or parties want secession sanctioned by international law, they
must undertake good faith efforts to exert their internal rights to selfdetermination. If those efforts are suppressed and the parent state perpetrates
further grave harms on the claimant, then international law should recognize
their right to secede. If the violations of the rights to internal selfdetermination become so egregious that they amount to violations of
peremptory norms, then they should have a legitimate appeal within
international law. In short, by adopting the Remedial Model, international
law could actually play a role in averting conflicts.
III. COMPETING MODELS OF SECESSION
Territories should not be permitted to secede merely because they have
the wherewithal to do so. Politically, a territory that is able to function like a
state may successfully secede, but functionality should not lie at the heart of
an internationally recognized legal right to secession (Functional Model).227
Further, while cultures may be a good thing to preserve, cultural preservation
should not be grounds for secession (Cultural Preservation Model).228
Finally, economic disparity among regions of a state should not warrant
secession (Economic Harms Model).229 The Remedial Model offers distinct
The Exceptions That Disprove the Rule? The Impact of Abkhazia and South Ossetia on
Exceptions to the Sovereignty Principle, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 241, 243–44 (2009) (noting that
Russian President Medvedev has gone so far as to accuse Georgia of genocide in South
Ossetia and of threatening the same in Abkhazia). But see generally Nicolai N. Petro, The
Legal Case for Russian Intervention in Georgia, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1524 (2009)
(presenting the legal case for Russia’s intervention).
225
Borgen, supra note 221, at 4–5.
226
Toal, supra note 223, at 676–77.
227
See infra Part III.B.
228
See infra Part III.C.
229
See infra Part III.D.
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advantages over these competitors. Basically, the Remedial Model focuses
on two more fundamental values than these other models, namely, the right
to internal self-determination and prohibitions against violations of
peremptory norms. Before examining each of these competing models in
turn, this Part begins with showing how the Remedial Model constructed
here fits into an overall rights framework.
A. Remedial Model
Analyses of secession models fit into various categories.230 The one
proposed in this Article is a remedial moral claim—right to secede. The
Remedial Model goes beyond proposing merely a liberty right to secede,
which focuses on whether the right should be permitted.231 Instead, the
Remedial Model invokes a stronger, moral right to secede, which, unlike a
liberty right, places obligations on others not to interfere with the secession
process.232 However, it goes one step further in proposing the right to secede
as a claim-right.233 A claim-right creates not only a moral obligation not to
interfere but also a legal obligation to establish the right to secede in two
ways. First, the international community needs to overcome the default
presumption against secession. Second, it needs to establish a means to
assess and recognize secession claims within an international law
framework.
Not all secessionist claims should be legitimized by
international law, but some should be. Most importantly, secession should
be thought of as a remedial, as contrasted with a primary right. Under the
remedial view, “secession is justified only as a remedy of last resort for
persistent and serious injustices.”234 Primary right theorists, in contrast,
argue that a right to secession does not depend upon a finding of injustices.235
They claim either that a right to secede can be made on ascriptive grounds,
such as the nationality of the peoples claiming the right; on democratic,
plebiscitary bases that reflect the preferences of peoples living within a
territory; or on administrative grounds that simply assess the capability to
function as an independent state.236
230
Allen Buchanan, Secession, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (2008), http://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/secession/.
231
Id.
232
Id.
233
Id.
234
Id.
235
Id.
236
See Harry Beran, A Liberal Theory of Secession, 32 POL. STUD. 21, 26 (1984) (showing
that liberalism requires that secession be permitted); David Gauthier, Breaking Up: An Essay

144

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 40:105

The Remedial Model contrasts most sharply with the ascriptive primary
rights view.237 A group can be ascribed or determined according to certain
characteristics such as age, nationality, race, and ethnicity.238 The type of
group at stake in the secession debate cannot be a neutral, civic quality
associated with membership in a state because the group claiming a right to
secede makes that claim against a state—a claim to separate from a state.
For example, Chechnya’s claim to a right to secede from Russia is not based
on their membership in the Russian state; it is based on grounds of the group
identity as Chechens.239 The same holds true of those who identify
themselves as Quebecois within Canada. However, as the Canadian
Supreme Court recently found, ascriptive rights to group identity are
insufficient grounds for a secession claim.240 It was not enough for the
Quebecois to claim that they were a distinct group within Canada; the group
also had to prove that it has been harmed.241
Secession rights are remedial rights invoked by a group under limited
conditions to rectify harms; they are not rights that apply to all citizens in
general. Philosopher Allen Buchanan has provided what is now regarded as
the classic formulation of the remedial-rights justification for secession.242
on Secession, 24 CAN. J. PHIL. 357, 357–58, 371 (1994) (proposing a permissive view of
secession as applied to legitimate political orders); Daniel Philpott, In Defense of SelfDetermination, 105 ETHICS 352, 352–84 (1995) (endorsing a plebiscitary rationale for
secession); Christopher H. Wellman, A Defense of Secession and Political Self-Determination,
24 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 142, 142–43 (1995) (analyzing when any individual or group has a
moral right to secede that is grounded in political self-determination); CHRISTOPHER HEATH
WELLMAN, A THEORY OF SECESSION: THE CASE FOR POLITICAL SELF-DETERMINATION 34–35
(2005) (supporting application of an administrative model to secession issues).
237
See CHAIM GANS, THE LIMITS OF NATIONALISM (2003) (discussing justifications and
limits of cultural nationalism from a liberal perspective); DAVID MILLER, CITIZENSHIP AND
NATIONAL IDENTITY (2000) (defending active citizenship and the principle of nationality as
compatible with minority rights); MARGARET MOORE, THE ETHICS OF NATIONALISM (2001)
(examining the ethics of secession); Avishai Margalit & Joseph Raz, National SelfDetermination, 87 J. PHIL. 439 (1990) (discussing ways in which law and morality should
interact over issues of national self-determination).
238
See Margalit & Raz, supra note 237, at 442–47 (explaining that there are many possible
ways to define a group that could qualify to exercise secession rights).
239
See Mike Bowker, Russia and Chechnya: The Issue of Secession, 10 NATIONS &
NATIONALISM 461, 463 (2004) (“In such cases [as the Chechens], living in one’s own
authoritarian nation-state may be perceived as preferable to being an ethnic minority in a
multicultural liberal democracy.”).
240
Quebec Secession, supra note 85, para. 154.
241
See supra Part II.E.1.a.
242
The relevant works are the following: BUCHANAN, supra note 69; Allen Buchanan,
Liberalism and Group Rights, in IN HARM’S WAY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JOEL FEINBERG 1
(1994); Allen Buchanan, What’s So Special about Nations?, in RETHINKING NATIONALISM 283
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His approach certainly represents an improvement over many attempts by
philosophers to enter the fray of international law. However, his proposal, as
will be shown, proves woefully inadequate. He proposes three grounds for a
remedial right to secession: (1) “large-scale and persistent violation of basic
human rights”; (2) unjust annexation; and (3) “in certain cases, the state’s
persisting violation of agreements to accord a minority group limited selfgovernment within the states.”243 While the analysis offered here builds on
Buchanan’s proposal, it differs from it in significant ways. First, it provides
a narrower interpretation of injustice244 than Buchanan’s proposal does
(although his latter writings lean more favorably in the direction of this
analysis than his previous ones). Second, contrary to Buchanan, unjust
annexation has nothing to do with secession.245 Third, Buchanan’s inclusion
of autonomy needs to be recast in terms of a more fundamental right to
internal self-determination.246 Fourth, an analysis of secessionist claims
needs to flesh out a more exact idea of group harms that is critical in
assessing secessionist claims.247
The Remedial Model improves upon not only previous philosophical
analyses but also legal ones. It offers an elaboration and clarification of a
position defended some time ago by Hurst Hannum, a law professor who
authored a classic legal text on self-determination.248 Accordingly, to
Hannum, the international community should support secession “if
(Jocelyne Couture et al. eds., 1996); Allen Buchanan, Theories of Secession, 26 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 30 (1997); Allen Buchanan, Self-Determination, Secession, and the Rule of Law, in THE
MORALITY OF NATIONALISM 301 (Robert McKim & Jeff McMahan eds., 1997) [hereinafter
Buchanan, Self-Determination, Secession, and the Rule of Law]; Allen Buchanan, The
International Institutional Dimension of Secession, in THEORIES OF SECESSION 227 (P.B.
Lehning ed., 1997); Allen Buchanan, Democracy and Secession, SECESSION AND NATIONAL
SELF-DETERMINATION 14 (Margaret Moore ed., 1998); Buchanan, supra note 230; Allen
Buchanan, The Quebec Secession Issue: Democracy, Minority Rights, and the Rule of Law, in
SECESSION AND SELF-DETERMINATION 238–71 (Stephen Macedo & Allen Buchanan eds.,
2003); ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: MORAL
FOUNDATIONS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007).
243
Buchanan, supra note 230.
244
See supra Part II.E.
245
See supra Part II.C.1.a.
246
See supra Part II.D.
247
See supra Part II.E.
248
HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE
ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS (1996). Hannum seems to have recently retreated
from his defense of a right to remedial secession in his most recent comments on the ICJ’s
Kosovo Advisory Opinion, The Advisory Opinion on Kosovo: An Opportunity Lost, or a
Poisoned Chalice Refused?, 24 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 155 (2011), wherein he never mentions
remedial secession.
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reasonable demands for local self-government or minority rights have been
arbitrarily rejected by a central government,” and when there have been
“massive, discriminatory human rights violations, approaching the scale of
genocide.”249 This Article has already spelled out what denials of internal
self-determination and what human rights violations justify a right to
secession.250 Indeed, internal self-determination has not played the role that
it should in secessionist claims. However, not every violation of human
rights should be a basis for a secession claim; only grave ones (violations of
peremptory norms) should be.
Overall, an injustice theory, which focuses on the wrongs in the world,
provides the framework for making sense and justifying secessionist
claims.251 A classical justice approach guides us to achieving the good. In
contrast, an injustice focus centers the analysis on rectifying wrongs.252
There may be disagreements over what types of groups deserve entitlements.
However, greater agreements can be forged over what harms should not
befall any group. The Remedial Model focuses on injustices inflicted upon
some peoples within a state.
B. Functional Model
The following section outlines the justifications for adopting a Functional
Model. If a majority group occupying a definitive territory can administer
itself efficiently, that alone should suffice as grounds for secession.
“[A]nyone who properly values self-determination should defend the right to
secede whenever both the separatist group and the remainder state would be
able and willing to perform the requisite political functions.”253 A territorial
group could demand secession on grounds that it can govern itself
satisfactorily. Good governance would include being able to protect citizens
from foreign threats. Secession under the Functional Model would not result
in an unwieldy proliferation of states since only functionally efficient states
would be able to secede. At best, proliferation of secession-related harms is
a potential worry, and, at worst, it has no basis in reality. If a few smaller
states result from secession movements amidst a sea of larger states, then that
249
Hurst Hannum, The Specter of Secession: Responding to Claims for Ethnic SelfDetermination, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 13, 16 (1998).
250
See supra Part II.D.
251
See generally SIMON, supra note 175, at 29–70 (setting forth the elements of a theory of
injustice).
252
Id. at 1–28 (differentiating theories of justice from theories of injustice).
253
WELLMAN, supra note 236, at 34–35.
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should not provide overwhelming cause for concern. Small states, such as
Liechtenstein and Andorra, have fared well in Europe. Alternatively, if
secessionist movements proliferate and create a world community of small
states, we have little past experience upon which to base our worries. A
world of small states may, for all we know, be more just than the current
nation-state system.
On the surface, the Functional Model does not create problems. Territory
B, which has the capability of performing efficiently as an independent state,
wants to secede from State A, which brokers little opposition to the break-up.
It sounds so simple. The seemingly simple, however, can be horrifyingly
complex, to which the case of the former Yugoslavia attests. While the
richness of the Remedial Model has been demonstrated in Part II by applying
it to the complicated case of Kosovo’s secessionist claims, a less complicated
example—the Slovak Republic—may help here.
1. Slovakia
The case of the Slovaks illustrates a complicated relationship between the
Functional and Remedial Models. First of all, critics provide incomplete and
misleading pictures of the Slovak case.254 Slovakia may have had justifiable
grounds under the Functional Model for seceding from Czechoslovakia, but
it did not have any strong group-harm grounds for seceding. Nevertheless,
the Slovak leaders put their case for secession largely in terms of group
harms.255 Regarding group harm, the Slovaks justifiably could have claimed
unfair treatment at the hands of the Czechs during the early 1920s.256 During
that period, Czechoslovakia, forced by economic conditions, curtailed
production by shutting down over two hundred Slovakian plants.257
254
Wellman claims that “secessionist groups couch their appeals in these [injustice] terms in
recognition that the international community is open to political reorganization only in cases
of extreme injustice, and this is evidence that the [Remedial Model] leaves no room for
secession grounded in self-determination.” Wellman, supra note 236, at 147 n.7. The
Remedial Model applies to questions of international intervention and does not preclude
alternative grounds for secession. Without an institutional mooring, Wellman’s right to
secede hovers in the inapplicable philosophical air.
255
See Robert Henry Cox & Erich G. Frankland, The Federal State and the Breakup of
Czechoslovakia: An Institutional Analysis, 25 PUBLIUS 71, 84 (1995) (“Slovaks had come to
identify Prague as the ‘oppressor’ and the federation ‘as almost a Czech invention and a Czech
con game, aimed at limiting Slovak autonomy.’ ”).
256
See Katarína Mathernová, Federalism That Failed: Reflections on the Disintegration of
Czechoslovakia, 1 NEW EUR. L. REV. 477, 479 (1993) (“[The Czechs] continued to feel
unequal and were arguably often treated as second-class citizens.”).
257
Claudia Saladin, Note, Self-Determination, Minority Rights, and Constitutional
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Subsequently, however, the Slovaks fared well in comparison to the Czechs
under the communist regime.258 For example, the Slovaks obtained “a
roughly proportional share of the country’s production.”259 Although the
Slovaks had a more agricultural economy in comparison to the more
industrialized Czechs,260 the differences in the economies had not produced
the kind of harms that would qualify the Slovaks as disadvantaged, and
economic disparity between regions is not tantamount to discrimination
against minorities. The Slovaks demanded recognition within the Czech and
Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR) as a disadvantaged, harmed group. Yet, the
Slovaks had a weak case for secession based on claims of group harm within
the CSFR.
In fact, the Slovaks were a powerful and privileged minority within the
CSFR. The CSFR had a population divided roughly among ten million
Czechs and five million Slovaks.261 Within the CSFR, the Slovaks had
gained a great deal of power despite their numerically minority status.262
The Slovaks demanded parity in all legislative and executive decisionmaking bodies on grounds of their minority status.263 The 1968 Constitution
gave the Slovaks considerable protection.264 The bicameral legislature
consisted of two houses: the Chamber of People, based strictly on
population; and the Chamber of Nations, divided equally between seventyfive Czechs and seventy-five Slovaks.265 Constitutional amendments
required a three-fifths absolute majority in the lower chamber plus threefifths of each national group in the Chamber of Nations, giving veto power to
the Slovaks.266 A minority vote of thirty-one could defeat constitutional
amendments and other major legislative acts requiring a three-fifths majority,
Accommodation: The Example of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, 13 MICH. J. INT’L L.
172, 200 (1991).
258
Id. at 210.
259
Id.
260
Radoslav Selucky, The Economic Equalization of Slovakia with the Czech Lands, 3
CZECHOSLOVAK ECON. PAPERS 42, 42 (1964).
261
“The Czechs have always outnumbered the Slovaks by more than two to one.” Lloyd N.
Cutler & Herman Schwartz, Constitutional Reform in Czechoslovakia: E Duobus Unum?, 58
U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 517 (1991).
262
Id. at 517–18 (“The Czechs staffed most of the administration in both regions, and in
general dominated the country.”).
263
Cox & Frankland, supra note 255, at 79.
264
Cutler & Schwartz, supra note 261, at 519.
265
Id.
266
Id. Ironically, the Slovaks opposed increasing the federation membership to include
Monrovia and Silesia. Katarina Mathernova, Czecho?Slovakia: Constitutional Disappointments,
in CONSTITUTION MAKING IN EASTERN EUROPE 57, 67 n.49 (A.E. Dick Howard ed., 1993).
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and thirty-eight votes of no confidence could (and did) bring down the
federal government.267
The 1968 Federation Act also provided parity in office holding.268 The
Constitutional Court had to be half Czech (six) and half Slovak (six)269 and
the president and vice-president of the Court had to be from different
republics.270 These structures largely remained intact following the October
1989 Velvet Revolution, a nonviolent protest against the Soviet-backed
communist rulers.271 They provided the minority Slovaks with considerable
power and protection. Herman Schwartz and Lloyd Cutler said that “[they]
know of no democratic government anywhere in which comparable
minorities of legislative bodies can have as much blocking power.”272 The
only similar federal structure is Belgium’s ethnic division between the
Walloons and the Flemish, but Belgium’s ethnic groups have enhanced
political control only over matters of language and culture that directly affect
them.273 Given their considerable power, harm and powerlessness are not
qualities easily ascribed to the Slovaks in the CSFR.
Historically, the main claim that Slovaks have for group harm is at the
hands, not of the Czechs, but of the Hungarians, who severely curtailed the
development of Slovak cultural and political life in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries.274
For example, the Hungarians closed Slovak
secondary schools, sharply restricted the Slovak voting rights, and did not
provide for universal male suffrage.275 Comparatively, during the same
period, the Czechs received somewhat benign treatment at the hands of the
Austrians.276 For instance, in 1907, the Czechs attained universal male
suffrage.277 The Czechs also had considerably more experience than did the
Slovaks at civil service positions in the government, giving them a
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See Mathernová, supra note 256, at 482 (arguing that a myopic focus on the national
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significant edge in governmental experience.278 Overall, however, the
Slovaks did not qualify as a harmed group within the CSFR.279 As one
writer stated, “[N]owhere in the history of the coexistence of these two
‘nations’ can one find a chapter similar to the Serb-Croatian scenario.”280
Nevertheless, the Slovaks had the wherewithal to secede and to carry out the
functions of governing after secession.281
Does the Remedial Model presuppose the Functional Model? In other
words, does the harm justification for secession depend upon an assurance
that the claimant state can, in fact, perform the functions necessary for
governance immediately following the secession? The answer to these
questions is a hesitant “no.” Functionality should not be used as a legal
condition for secession, however, it should be a factor in a legal assessment.
After all, international law should not be responsible for upholding the right
of a claimant to secede when that claimant will in all likelihood fail as a
newly independent state. The Remedial Model does integrate these concerns
when it requires an assessment of the claimant’s relationship to the parent
state and, more pointedly, when it assesses the claimant’s attempts at internal
self-determination. These attempts are often thwarted when the parent state
is in crisis. Potential failed states generally make little headway at internal
self-determination.
Secessionist movements often involve minorities within minorities. For
example, Slovakia has two significant minorities within its borders. The
Slovak Republic has a sizable Hungarian minority. First, the Slovaks and
Hungarians have a long history of bitterness toward one another. In the
1990s, the Slovak government’s actions against its Hungarian minority
caused a great deal of saber rattling between it and neighboring Hungary.
The Hungarians complained of not being able to use their last names first, of
the potential elimination of Hungarian-only schools, and of Slovakian road
signs. The European Council, in response to the increased tension between
Slovakia and Hungary, conditioned Slovakia’s application for European
Union membership on Slovak assurances of protections for its Hungarian
minority.282 However, the harms experienced by a second minority—the
Roma—far exceed those claimed by the Hungarians.283 The Roma suffer a
278
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disproportionately higher rate of poverty, unemployment, hate crimes, and
disease.284 Both the Hungarians and the Roma, however, pose serious group
harm issues for the Slovak Republic. Actual and potential group harm issues
should trigger regional and international involvement in any secession
claims. Even uncontested secession presents risks of group harm. Buchanan
correctly notes that “[t]he greater the risk, the stronger the case for subjecting
the secessionist efforts to the rule of international law.”285 However, he
incorrectly associates an uncontested secession with a risk-free one, as the
Slovak case illustrates.
There are obvious parallels between the Slovakia and Kosovo cases. The
territory of Kosovo contains a sizeable and vulnerable minority population,
namely, the Serbs.
Kosovar Serbs have experienced considerable
discrimination and violence while under the rule of Kosovar Albanians.
Recently, Serbian churches, houses, and people have been attacked in
sporadic incidents.286 This creates a worry about their future treatment under
an independent Kosovo, just as the European Council worried over the
treatment of Hungarians in an independent Slovak Republic. This will
always be a worry for anyone concerned with minority rights. However, it is
important to understand what the problem with a Serb minority in Kosovo is
not. The situation has not come to a point even approaching a case for
secession of Northern Kosovo, where most Serbs reside.287 Serbia’s action
against Kosovo clearly was state sponsored. While the government of
Kosovo might have responsibility for not having prevented violence against
its Serbian minority, there is no evidence to suggest that it directly sponsored
the violence.288 No doubt, Kosovo’s de facto independence will result in
more violence against Serbs, however, Kosovo must deal with that prospect
directly since Kosovo contains pockets of significant Serb populations
throughout its territories.
A far more vulnerable minority in Kosovo is a group that has received
relatively little attention despite that their numbers almost equal those of
Serbs. Some of the direst situations that Kosovo Roma find themselves in
are under the auspices of the U.N. The U.N. sets and directs a housing
passim (2001).
284
Id.
285
Buchanan, Self-Determination, Secession, and the Rule of Law, supra note 242, at 304.
286
Mark A. Wolfgram, When the Men with Guns Rule: Explaining Human Rights Failures
in Kosovo Since 1999, 123 POL. SCI. Q. 461, 476–77 (2008).
287
Oisín Tansey, Kosovo: Independence and Tutelage, 20 J. DEMOCRACY 153 passim
(2009).
288
U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim
Administrative Mission in Kosovo, U.N. Doc. S/2007/768 (Jan. 3, 2008).
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project in northern Mitrovica, where Roma live atop lead-infected slag heaps
from a defunct mine.289 Kosovo at least has tried to address the plight of the
Roma since its UDL.290
This case study raises some troublesome issues. Should the negative
treatment of minorities by a seceding territory block its secession? Should
secession be conditioned on guarantees to protect minorities? Perhaps,
someday, international law will recognize minority protection as a
peremptory norm. However, it would be a major progressive step if,
minimally, international law would fully adopt the Remedial Model of
secession. By doing so, the international community would at least go on
record with a commitment to protect minorities from grave harms and to map
out a secessionist road to alleviate those harms. The first way to approach
group harm problems within a seceding state is through minority protection
measures within the new state and not as a condition for forming a state.
C. Cultural Preservation Model
Should a territory have a right to secede to preserve its culture? In the
Cultural Preservation Model, the following conditions must be met:
(1) The culture in question must in fact be imperiled.[291] (2)
Less disruptive ways of preserving the culture . . . must be
unavailable or inadequate. (3) The culture in question must
meet minimal standards of justice . . . . (4) The seceding
cultural group must not be seeking independence in order to
establish an illiberal state, that is, one which fails to uphold
basic individual civil and political rights, and from which free
exit is denied. (5) Neither the state nor any third party can have
a valid claim to the seceding territory.292
289

LUNCHAKORN PRATHUMRATANA ET AL., INT’L ENVIRON. RES. CTR., HEAVY METAL
CONTAMINATION OF THE MINING AND SMELTING DISTRICT IN MITROVICA, KOSOVO 480 (2008),
available at http://www.geo.sc.chula.ac.th/Geology/Thai/News/Technique/GREAT_2008/PDF/
138.pdf.
290
OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER OF KOS., STRATEGY FOR THE INTEGRATION OF ROMA,
ASHKALI AND EGYPTIAN COMMUNITIES IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOSOVO (Dec. 2008), available at
http://www.roma-kosovoinfo.com/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=
100&Itemid=.
291
Cf. Avishai Margalit & Joseph Raz, National Self-Determination, 87 J. PHIL. 439 (1990)
(arguing that a culture need not be imperiled and that any group with certain ascriptive
characteristics should have a right to secession).
292
BUCHANAN, supra note 69, at 61.
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A prominent and still ongoing secession movement is found in the attempts
to separate Quebec from Canada. Culture has played a key role in this
dispute.
1. Quebec
According to some analysts, Quebec does not satisfy conditions (1), (2),
and (5).293 However, conditions (1) and (2) are too vague. If culture had a
relatively clear-cut definition, then it would be easy to specify the imperiling
factors needed to fulfill the first condition. However, cultural unity depends
considerably on subjective elements. A great deal of what holds a culture
together depends upon the collective mindset of the culture-bearers. Many
Quebecois find their culture imperiled.294 So, whether a state has taken
sufficient measure to preserve a culture is not an empirical question, but
rather is roughly measurable in objective terms. The situation becomes
further complicated by the fact that imperiling forces often serve to
strengthen cultures, or, at least, to bolster the way people think about their
culture. With respect to condition (2), some Quebecois saw secession as the
only alternative.295 In 1995, Quebec narrowly defeated a referendum for
Quebec’ secession from Canada.296 If culture preservation makes up the goal
of secession, then subjective factors become telling.
However, cultural preservation alone does not justify secession. Many
aspects of a culture (but not all) and many cultures (but not all) merit
preservation. For example, a culture that engages in genocide would not be
worthy of preservation. Many of us (but not all) cherish the opportunity to
observe and participate in the diverse activities of other groups. However,
the parenthetical qualifiers raise warning signals. Passing over those cultures
designated as “illiberal”—ones that violate liberal values of individual
freedoms—poses more problems than it solves.297 How illiberal? Does a
single practice, such as female genital mutilation, make a culture illiberal?
293

See, e.g., id.
Stephen Alvstad, Note and Comment, The Quebec Secession Issue, with an Emphasis on
the “Cultural” Side of the Equation, 18 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 89, 91–92 (2004).
295
Emmanuelle Richez & Marc Andre Bodet, Fear and Disappointment: Explaining the
Persistence of Support for Quebec Secession, 22 J. ELECTIONS, PUB. OPINIONS & PARTIES 1
(2012).
296
Alvstad, supra note 294, at 96.
297
See Gerald Doppelt, Illiberal Cultures and Group Rights: A Critique of Multiculturalism
in Kymlicka, Taylor, and Nussbaum, 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 661, 662 (2002) (finding
multicultural liberalism wanting in its position on illiberal groups).
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Assuming we can fill in the details of conditions of illiberal cultures, further
problems arise. Preserving a culture is not an entirely innocent activity. It
involves a twofold homogenization process. First, campaigns to preserve
culture promote single interpretations of the culture. Diversity within the
culture becomes discouraged in the name of establishing or reestablishing the
culture. Second, bringing one culture into ascendancy tends to lead to
devaluing other cultures. The devaluation does not occur “by necessity.”
However, when preserving a culture comes to the forefront of political and
social consciousness, a culture strengthens relative to its proponents setting
themselves apart from other cultures.298 Movements to preserve a culture do
not always lead to more toleration of other cultures.299
However interesting and valuable any given culture might be, no culture,
in absence of harm, is valuable enough to trigger international protection of it
through state secession. To take an approach committed to the preservation
of all cultures would place the international community in the unwelcome
position of designating some cultures and their practices as worthy of
protection and others as not as worthy. Further, the quest to protect one
culture may adversely affect another culture, resulting in a domino effect of
unintended consequences. For example, Quebec’s quest for an independent
state may come at the expense of its indigenous Cree population, a tribe of
indigenous peoples located in northern Quebec.300 This does not mean that,
even in the absence of a strong showing of group harm, Quebec should be
denied the possibility of secession. If a referendum succeeds in Quebec,
then, ceterus paribus, international law should not serve as an impediment to
consensual secession. Severe group harm should trigger international
adjudicatory intervention and open the possibility of an internationally
legally sanctioned remedy of secession following the steps outlined in the
Remedial Model.
The discussion thus far has assumed that we understand the meaning of
culture. What other grounds might demarcate one culture from another
besides language? Except for aspects of language, the secessionist case for
Western Canada resembles Quebec’s.301 With its frontier mystique, a
298
Thomas W. Simon, Groups: Rights, Wrongs, and Culture, in GROUPS AND GROUP RIGHTS
96, 107 (Christine Sistare et al. eds., 2001).
299
See Introduction: Reasonable Tolerance, in THE CULTURE OF TOLERATION IN DIVERSE
SOCIETIES (Catrionia McKinnon & Dario Castiglione eds., 2003) (noting the tension between
liberal societies and their practices of toleration).
300
See generally Douglas Sanders, If Quebec Secedes from Canada Can the Cree Secede from
Quebec?, 29 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 143 (1995) (examining whether Quebec’s secession from
Canada would allow the indigenous peoples of Quebec to secede from Quebec).
301
Greg Craven, Of Federalism, Secession, Canada and Quebec, 14 DALHOUSIE L.J. 231,
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kaleidoscopic population (French and English groups constitute less than
50% of the population), stereotypic farm-hick-parochial-clod image,
historical grievances (including, unlike other provinces, the denial of control
over land and resources), and economic discrimination stemming from the
National Policy of 1879, Western Canada has grounds to call itself a separate
culture.302
The case for cultural preservation strengthens when tied to group harm.
If Quebec could show that its culture became imperiled because of a
discriminatory disparate impact experienced by its citizens in their capacity
as Quebecois and that group harm continues to manifest itself, then Quebec
would have a stronger case for justifying secession than if it based its claim
primarily on grounds of cultural preservation. Whatever we might think
about preserving a particular culture, the case for preservation becomes
particularly acute when preservation is linked to systematic harm directed at
the group. Not all threats to a culture constitute harms. For instance, Canada
could refuse to provide enough funds for French films or could torture
Quebecois because of their group affiliation. The first activity might
threaten Quebec’s culture; the second constitutes group harm. Absent a
showing of severe group harm, neither Quebec nor Western Canada has a
strong case for a legally cognizable right to secession. Surprisingly, the
Crees do not have a particularly strong case of group harm vis-à-vis Quebec.
The Crees have legitimate complaints against the Quebecois for past actions,
but many of these have been rectified.303 The primary charge by the Crees
against Quebec is the denial of their right of self-determination and their
right to stay within Canada if Quebec seceded.304 The Crees have legitimate
complaints. The indigenous status of the Crees further complicates the case
since international law has come to analyze indigenous peoples differently
than, for example, minorities. Nevertheless, the Crees would not have a
strong group harm case.

238 (1991–1992).
302
See generally Don Ray & Ralph R. Premdas, The Canadian West: A Case of Regional
Separatism, in SECESSIONIST MOVEMENTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 196 (Ralph R.
Premdas et al. eds., 1990) (detailing case studies of secession movements around the world).
303
Matthew Coon Come, The Status and Rights of the James Bay Crees in the Context of
Québec Secession from Canada, 6 CONST. F. 24, 27 (1994) (“[I]t is specifically recognized that
the Parliament and the Government of Canada have a ‘special responsibility’ to the Crees.”).
304
See GRAND COUNCIL OF THE CREES, SOVEREIGN INJUSTICE: FORCIBLE INCLUSION OF THE
JAMES BAY CREES AND CREE TERRITORY INTO A SOVEREIGN QUÉBEC 32–36 (1995) (exploring
the case for the secession of indigenous peoples from Quebec).

156

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 40:105

Thus, the Remedial Model assimilates those aspects of cultural
preservation that connect to harm and rejects claims that see culture as the
sole or primary phenomenon in need of protection.
D. Economic Harms Model
Are there other kinds of harms, other than the discriminatory harms used
in the Remedial Model, that justify secession? History has provided a
number of secessionist claims based on alleged economic unfairness. In
these cases, one region will claim that it produces a significant portion of a
country’s wealth without receiving back its rightful share from the central
government.
Buchanan defined this discriminatory redistribution as
“implementing taxation schemes or regulatory policies or economic
programs that systematically work to the disadvantage of some groups, while
benefiting others, in morally arbitrary ways.”305 He found that
there may well be cases in which it is justifiable for the better
off to secede simply in order to pursue their prosperity more
effectively, unimpeded by the constraints that being in the
same state with the worse off has imposed on them, without
basing their justification for secession on any charge that they,
the better off, have suffered injustice.306
Buchanan cited two modern day examples where the Katangan and Biafran
“haves” tried to sever ties from their respective “have-nots.”307
1. Katanga
In 1960, the newly declared independent Republic of Congo immediately
faced a secessionist movement by its southern-most province, Katanga.308
With only 13% of the Congo’s population, Katanga had most of the
country’s wealth.309 Yet, it “contributed 50 percent of the Congo’s total

305

BUCHANAN, supra note 69, at 40.
Id. at 120.
307
Id. at 114.
308
Id. at 21–22 (characterizing the Katanga case as a state emerging out of anarchy and not
secession); see also CATHERINE HOSKYNS, THE CONGO SINCE INDEPENDENCE, JANUARY 1960–
DECEMBER 1961 (1965).
309
René Lemarchand, The Limits of Self-Determination: The Case of the Katanga Secession,
56 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 404, 405 (1962).
306
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revenues and received only 20 percent of total government expenditures.”310
Katanga’s status as a wealthy region cannot be severed from past injustices,
from its “unsavory associations with neocolonialism and mining interests.”311
Katanga asked the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights to
recognize its UDL.312 The Commission ruled:
In the absence of concrete evidence of violations of human
rights to the point that the territorial integrity of Zaire should be
called to question and in the absence of evidence that the
people of Katanga are denied the right to participate in
Government . . . the Commission holds the view that Katanga
is obliged to exercise a variant of self-determination that is
compatible with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
Zaire.313
In other words, in the absence of a showing of denial of internal selfdetermination and group harms, Katanga lost its secessionist bid. The U.N.
became immersed in the controversy, ultimately helping to stifle Katanga’s
secessionist aspirations.314
2. Biafra
Biafrans clearly held the wealth, especially relative to the rest of Nigeria.
With only “22 percent of the Nigerian population, [Biafra] contributed 38
percent of total revenues, and received back from the government only 14
percent of those revenues.”315 The U.N. and the international community
carefully avoided direct action in the Biafran war.316 However, upon closer
inspection, the international community refused to aid directly the have-nots.
For although the Biafrans held the wealth, the Ibo—the only Biafrans,
310

BUCHANAN, supra note 69, at 41.
YOUNG, supra note 213, at 81.
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Afr. Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Eighth Annual Activity Rep. of the
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YOUNG, POLITICS IN THE CONGO: DECOLONIALIZATION AND INDEPENDENCE 325–30 (1965).
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arguably, to have experienced group harm, and the only strong supporters of
secession—did not.317
Claims of economic misdistribution should not become legally
enforceable grounds for secession. Secession should be a tool to help
remedy the plight of the disadvantaged under certain circumstances—it
should not become another means to advance the cause of the advantaged.
IV. LEGAL FORUMS FOR SECESSIONIST CLAIMS
As argued in the previous Part, none of the usual grounds for secession—
state administrative capability, preservation of culture, or economic harm—
successfully justifies a secessionist claim. Rather, any adjudicatory regime
for addressing secession must first focus on the harms alleged by the
seceding territory. What legal forums are there for adjudicating secessionist
claims?
Questions of self-determination and secession often resolve themselves in
the political or military arenas with force playing a major role in the
resolution.318 Do groups have any other way to resolve their disputes? If
groups have opportunities to express their grievances in an adjudicatory
forum, perhaps there would be a drop in the incidences of group violence.
However utopian, it is important to propose theoretical justifications for and
structures of an international adjudicatory system. Obviously, the world
needs alternatives to violent group conflicts. Could some groups have
avoided the hatred and the violence if they had other avenues of expressing
their grievances? Perhaps those individuals who were discriminated against
because of their perceived group affiliation could have found an international
forum to hear their grievances when their state system failed them. Perhaps
an adjudication that took place outside the bounds of the state could sanction
greater autonomy for the group within a state. Perhaps an international
judicial body could hear a case concerning secession before the grievances
reached a breaking point.
Pie-in-the-sky legalism is contrary to a realist position, which rules out
morality, that sees little or no role for law in questions of secession or, for
that matter, in issues of self-determination.319 Realists argue that states obey
317
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international law only out of self-interest.320 Yet, appeals to law seem
unavoidable, especially if “law” is defined broadly as a set of rules and
mechanism for adjudicating disputes. Adjudicatory institutions are well
suited to make decisions about harms. Thus, this Part explores the feasible
judicial approaches to secessionist claims, other than the ICJ advisory
opinion route that this Article has focused on so far. Secession claims
primarily have employed the language of law.321 Even if putting the claims
in legal terms does not have a major impact on events, the resulting legal
analyses should set the framework for evaluating the actions: Is a
secessionist movement making legally and morally legitimate demands?
Further, are those demands defensible within a justifiable theory of
international law? What are the legally cognizable moral grounds for
secession? What international institutions should adjudicate these claims?
The answers to these questions lie partially in which grounds fail as
justifications for secession. Legal theorists were among the first to direct
scholarly attention to the legal principles underlying secession.322 Political
philosophers have recently devoted considerable attention to moral
justifications of secession.323 Some have complained, however, that the
current moral discussions have limited application.324 The Remedial Model
meets the challenge by constructing morally sound principles that could be
realistically implemented into international law.325
This pushes the
discussion a step beyond where legal theorists and political philosophers
have taken it thus far. Theorists, to date, have only hinted at how to
operationalize, within current international institutional structures, the moral
justifications for secession.326 The relatively unknown Human Rights
320
JACK DONNELLY, REALISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 44 (2000); see also KENNETH
N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 91 (1979) (“International politics is more
nearly a realm in which anything goes.”). For a recent controversial realist work, see JACK L.
GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005). For a critique of
realism, see BUCHANAN, supra note 140, at 30–31.
321
See supra Part II.C.1.
322
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323
See SECESSION AS PHENOMENON, supra note 322.
324
David Gauthier, Breaking Up: An Essay on Secession, 24 CAN. J. PHIL. 357, 357 (1994).
325
See infra Part IV.B.
326
Buchanan, despite his call for an institutional morality, has little to say about the

160

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 40:105

Committee (HRC) holds promise as an arbiter of secession disputes, but the
Committee for CERD can make an even stronger case.
Before embarking on this ambitious project, there are concerns that the
entire enterprise engages the issues too late (or too early), operates at a level
too global and too unrealistic, and analyzes primarily historical rather than
current cases. First, critics claim that questions about secession for outsiders
come either too late or too soon.327 Outsiders debate secession issues either
after the fact (when it is too late to change) or before the fact (when it is too
early for outside interference).328 In response to this concern, the Remedial
Model attempts to stake out a middle ground by paving the way for
secessionists’ claims to become part of a reasonable debate outside the
confines of the state. The project may begin to make more sense and to be
more worth undertaking if secession issues are seen as occupying a middle
ground between discrimination and genocide. Although, however ineffective
at present, some regional and international mechanisms already exist for
addressing discrimination against a group outside the state where the
discrimination takes place.329 Taking the next step toward entertaining
secessionist’s claims just may prevent, lower the probability, or stave off the
worst group harm—genocide. Second, critics argue that an international
focus on secession claims bypasses more effective and more realistic local
and regional approaches to addressing the issues.330 However, the Remedial
Model does not rule out similar or complementary approaches proposed at
local, intrastate, or regional levels. Whatever progress unfolds at other
institutional instantiation of his principles for secession. He hints at the role of the World
Court (the ICJ) but ignores the problem of overcoming the fact that Article 34 of the Court’s
statute dictates that “[o]nly States may be parties in cases before the Court.” Statute of the
International Court of Justice art. 34(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, T.S. No. 993; see
generally Buchanan, Self-Determination, Secession, and the Rule of Law, supra note 242.
327
See generally Donald L. Horowitz, The Cracked Foundations of the Right to Secede, 14
J. DEMOCRACY 5 (2003) (arguing that secession is rarely a sound option, that having a specific
secession remedy available may hinder parties’ consideration of alternative resolutions, and
that too limited a secession right may perpetuate oppression by allowing the majority’s
hostility to continue so long that the minority seeks vengeance).
328
Id.
329
See LERNER, supra note 176, at 30–31 (noting that examples include: “[t]he European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Article 14), the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (Preamble, Article II), the American
Convention on Human Rights (Articles 1 and 24), and the African Charter on Human and
People’s Rights (Articles 2, 3, and 19)”).
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See, e.g., Susanna Mancini, Rethinking the Boundaries of Democratic Secession:
Liberalism, Nationalism, and the Right of Minorities to Self-Determination, 6 INT’L J. CONST.
L. 553, 581 (2008) (advocating the use of procedural secession, which allowed for the “velvet
divorce” of the Czechs and the Slovaks).
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levels, the international one plays a crucial role. An international structure
has the advantage of having less at stake in a secessionist issue by being the
furthest removed from the conflict. Third, a critic might charge that the
analysis provided here is too remote because it concentrates on ethical
justifications and on historical cases. However, historical cases provide an
opportunity to construct and defend a sound ethical and legal framework,
providing the foundation for answers to current crises. There are two viable
U.N. treaty bodies that are likely places to begin implementing the Remedial
Model. While the HRC is more established, CERD has a stronger
philosophical and legal basis for addressing secession and its attendant
claims.
A judicial approach to secession should be substantive and not merely
procedural. In a procedural model, a group need only meet specified
procedure hurdles (for example, three quarters of the residents of the
seceding territory must vote for secession after a designated waiting period)
to invoke a right of secession.331 In a substantive model, a group must prove
substantive claims, such as harm to its members.332 Contrary to the
arguments of some commentators,333 courts are not more likely to exhibit a
bias under the substantive than under the procedural model since national
courts are creatures of the state whose sovereignty is challenged by
substantive claims challenge. Further, an external, regional, or international
adjudication would more likely exhibit independence than an internal, state
court since these would have less vested in the particular secession issue. An
international tribunal should adjudicate substantive secession claims,
particularly since, presumably, it would have the least amount of vested
interest in the controversy. How could this take place within existing
international structures? Between the two most viable candidates—the HRC
and CERD—among the human rights treaty bodies, the latter has a stronger
case.

331
See id. at 578 (noting the secession example of Serbia and Montenegro, which
democratized secession and made it a legal, rather than political, issue).
332
Id. at 579.
333
For example, Buchanan sees the potential for biased referees as tipping the scales in
favor of a procedural model of a constitutional right to secede over a substantive one.
BUCHANAN, supra note 69, at 138–39. But the independent-international mechanism
proposed here would counter the biased referee problem.

162

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 40:105

A. The Human Rights Committee
The HRC, formed in 1977,334 has jurisdiction to hear complaints about the
right to self-determination.335 States do not have representatives on the
HRC, rather, states elect HRC members from a list of qualified nominees.336
This gives the HRC some measure of independence from its sponsoring
states.337 The HRC operates by consensus and issues opinions on
complaints, although provisions exist for appending individual opinions to
cases brought before the HRC.338 Article 1 of both the ICCPR and the
ICESCR states: “All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue
of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social and cultural development.”339
Interpretations must operate within the confines of this language, and
nothing precludes an expansive reading of “peoples,” that would take it
outside of the colonial context.340 As developed thus far, self-determination
has been developed in the context of decolonization, but that does not rule
out a more expansive interpretation in the future.341 If a minority constituted
a “people,” then it would qualify as a candidate for self-determination. Once
minorities are recognized, then the remedial road to secession begins with
harms to them established under Article 26, which protects persons from
discrimination342—most pointedly, harms that undermine the minority’s right
to “freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic,
social and cultural development.”343 In other words, secession could remedy
harms that undermined internal self-determination.344 The structure of the

334
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HRC and the language of the ICCPR do not impede implementation of the
Remedial Model.
1. Reporting
Article 40 of the ICCPR requires states to report to the HRC, and this is
the only reporting obligation states adopt after ratifying the ICCPR.345 State
parties must describe measures taken to implement rights, including the right
to self-determination, contained in Article 1 of the ICCPR.346 The ensuing
constructive dialogue between the HRC and the reporting state347 could open
a consideration of conditions for internal self-determination. The HRC has
established a five-year cycle for submitting reports after the first report after
ratification.348 Supplemental reports could help to maintain the dialogue
between a state and the HRC.349 Because the HRC has no fact-finding
powers itself, it should make more extensive use of other agencies and of
NGOs. Although the HRC technically is not a part of the U.N., it does
submit an annual report to the Economic and Social Council of the U.N.
General Assembly.350
To date, few countries have even referred to Article 1 in their reports and
when they do, they only address the issues in vague terms.351 Specific
recommendations need to be addressed to state parties. The HRC continues
to miss opportunities by providing only definitions and guidelines in its
commentaries on the reports. An indication of how a report could open a
dialogue about potential secession issues came when Mrs. Higgins, during
consideration of Senegal’s report, “ ‘sought more specific information about
demands for autonomy in Casamance, which the Senegal government
seemed inclined to interpret as a demand for secession that must be
opposed.’ ”352 The report could open the doors to a discussion of a country’s
minority problem.
345

ICCPR, supra note 84, art. 40.
Id. arts. 1, 40.
347
Id. art. 40.
348
U.N. HRC, Decision on Periodicity, para. 2(a), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/19/Rev.1 (Aug. 26,
1983).
349
The HRC can request supplemental information. Human Rights Comm., Rules of
Procedure of the Human Rights Comm., r. 71(2), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/3/Rev.9 (Jan. 13, 2011).
350
Id. r. 63; ICCPR, supra note 84, art. 45.
351
HANNUM, supra note 248, at 41.
352
DOMINIC MCGOLDRICK, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE: ITS ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 268 n.115 (1991) (citation
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2. Complaints
The Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, which provides an inquiry and a
complaints procedure, allows the HRC to hear individual complaints.353 The
HRC has registered fewer than 600 communications in more than fifteen
years of work.354 NGOs have not been granted the right to petition the
HRC.355 While carrying considerable moral authority, the HRC issues
nonbinding opinions (“views”) on complaints.356 An opinion includes “nonbinding recommendations.”357 Individual complaints of discrimination take
on critical importance, particularly if failure to address them might engender
recourse to violence.
The HRC has rejected complaints by groups. It came close to allowing
group representatives to make group harm claims under the Optional
Protocol in A.D. v. Canada.358 There, it denied the admissibility of the claim
of the Grand Captain of the Mikmaq tribal society that the Mikmaq were
denied the right of self-determination because of harmful policies inflicted
upon them by the Canadian government.359 The HRC found that he had not
been authorized to serve as a representative of the Mikmaq and that he had
not demonstrated that he was personally a victim of any right protected by
the ICCPR.360 The first part of the HRC’s approach makes good sense. The
HRC needs to determine whether someone truly represents the group.
However, being a group representative does not entail personal injury. The
issue is not individual harm to the group representative, it is harm to
members of the group because of their group status. Unfortunately, in a
subsequent case—Lubicon Lake—the HRC effectively severed the right of
self-determination from the complaint process under the Optional
Protocol.361 The HRC has moved to an interpretation whereby it regards the
Optional Protocol as covering complaints by individuals qua individuals,
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Optional Protocol, supra note 338, art 1.
Jack Donnelly, The Past, The Present, and the Future Prospects, in INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS AND ETHNIC CONFLICT 48, 55 (Milton J. Esman & Shibley Telhami eds.,
1995).
355
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356
TYAGI, supra note 334, at 587–88.
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Id. at 587.
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A.D. v. Can., Human Rights Comm. Decision on Inadmissibility, at 200, U.N. Doc.
A/39/40 (Sept. 20, 1984).
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Id.
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Lubicon Lake Band v. Can., Human Rights Comm. Views Under Article 5 Paragraph 4
of the Optimal Protocol, at 1, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 A/45/40 (Mar. 26, 1990).
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whereas Article 1 of the ICCPR deals with rights conferred upon people as
such.362 Again, nothing precludes the HRC from rescinding this position and
entertaining claims of harm to group members brought by group
representatives.
3. Arbitration and Advisory Opinions
The HRC can employ a two-step arbitration procedure. First, the HRC
can exercise its “good offices,” whereby the services of the HRC are offered
to the parties in order to achieve a friendly solution to the dispute.363 Second,
an ad hoc Conciliation Commission, “consist[ing] of five persons acceptable
to the State Parties concerned,” can address the matter.364 Obviously,
arbitration has great potential for preventing disputes from escalating into
violence. Unfortunately, the HRC does not have authority to issue advisory
opinions.365 If the U.N. General Assembly has so authorized, “organs of the
United Nations and specialized agencies . . . may also request advisory
opinions of the [ICJ].”366 Provisional measures also can be sought from the
ICJ.367 For example, in 2008, to preserve its rights under the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(ICERD),368 the Republic of Georgia filed a request from the ICJ to take
provisional measures under Article 41 to use force against the Russian
Federation for the latter’s role in ethnic discrimination and ethnic
cleansing.369 The ICJ granted the request for provisional measures.370
4. Remedies
The HRC does not have a sterling record of compliance with its
decisions.371 “Until 31 July 2009, eleven State parties (Botswana, the CAR,
362
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ICCPR, supra note 84, art. 42, para. 1(a).
364
Id. para. 1(b).
365
TYAGI, supra note 334, at 587–88.
366
U.N. Charter art. 96.
367
Id. art. 40.
368
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec.
21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter ICERD].
369
Case Concerning Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (Geor. v. Russ.), 2008 I.C.J. 353, 355 (Oct. 15) [hereinafter
Georgia ICJ Case].
370
Id. para. 148.
371
Thomas Buergenthal, The U.N. Human Rights Committee, 2001 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N.
L. 341, 375 (Jochen A. Frowein & Rüdiger Wolfrum eds.) (“Roughly 30 per cent of the
363
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the DRC, Equatorial Guinea, the Gambia, Namibia, Panama, the Sudan, the
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Yemen and Zambia) failed to
submit the requisite information.”372 In contrast, Canada, Denmark, France,
Jamaica, Mauritius, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries have
cooperated. The HRC has not adopted any supervisory or enforcement
mechanisms. With this relatively dismal record, how can anyone expect the
HRC to play an even greater role in international law, particularly with
regard to a radical remedy like secession?
The study of international law and international organizations has been
plagued by the failure to dream. The HRC receives little publicity, and its
decisions have not stimulated many prescriptive discussions over what role it
should play. Grand dreams should be encouraged within the confines of
detailed institutional mechanisms. In this context, a secession remedy does
not seem as far-fetched as it first looks. The forces directing a group toward
secession do not operate in isolation. Lesser forms of discrimination often
serve as early warning signs. The state, for example, takes action against
individuals because of their minority status by refusing them public housing.
Recognizing the possibility of secession puts debates over remedying group
harms in a new light. It gives them a sense of importance and urgency.
Secession comes as a remedy of last resort when other forms fail.
Compliance with it depends upon the history of previous attempts to address
the grounds for secession. The opinion of an independent adjudicatory body
like the HRC would lend credence to or help undermine support for a
secessionist claim.
B. Committee on the Eradication of Racial Discrimination
Human rights law seems like a hodgepodge of ad hoc measures cobbled
together to make it look like the international community is responding to
conflicts. However, there is supposed to be an underlying logic and order to
international law. First, nations come together to agree on basic
principles.373 The principles set forth in these declarations are aspirational,
replies received could be considered satisfactory in that they display the State party’s
willingness to implement the Committee’s Views or to offer the applicant an appropriate
remedy.”). Follow-up procedures have improved since the HRC appointed one of its
members as its Special Rapporteur for Follow-Up on Concluding Observations in 2002.
TYAGI, supra note 334, at 264–68.
372
TYAGI, supra note 334, at 265.
373
U.N. General Assembly resolutions and declarations are not binding. U.N. Charter arts.
4, 10–12; see also GERHARD VON GLAHN & JAMES LARRY TAULBEE, LAW AMONG NATIONS
399 (9th ed. 2010) (“As a General Assembly Resolution, the UDHR stands as a statement of
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expressing the hopes and expectations of the direction that international law
will take.374 Only when codified in the form of treaties, in the second stage,
do these declarations of principles take on the force of law.375 Creating
institutions to implement the treaties marks the final stage when nations sign
onto optional protocols within a treaty.
The adoption of ICERD followed this orderly progression.376 It was the
first human rights treaty to codify a portion of the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Rights, coming into force in 1969.377 ICERD, unanimously
adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on December 21, 1965, ranks as one
of the most widely supported human rights treaties378—173 nations have
ratified it.379 Further, it was the first human rights treaty to set up a
monitoring mechanism.380 Its Committee (CERD) periodically reviews
reports from the State Party members to the treaty.381 CERD has the shortest
reporting period—two years—as compared to four or more years for other
treaty monitoring bodies.382 Given this shorter reporting period, CERD
examines a relatively large number of state reports each year.383
Under Article 14, individuals may submit complaints to CERD.384
Article 14
establishes a procedure that makes it possible for an individual
or a group of persons claiming to be the victim of racial
desired goals rather than black letter, substantive law.”).
374
GLAHN & TAULBEE, supra note 373, at 399.
375
The International Law Commission, created in 1947 by the U.N., which plays a critical
role in drafting multilateral treaties, defines codification as “the more precise formulation and
systematization of rules of international law in fields where there already has been extensive
State practice, precedent and doctrine.” U.N. Secretary-General, Survey of International Law,
at 3, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/1/Rev.1 (Feb. 10, 1949).
376
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24 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 61, 62–63 (2008) (examining the U.S. government’s actions with
respect to CERD).
377
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A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). For an overview of the implementation of the ICERD, see
Patrick Thornberry, Confronting Racial Discrimination: A CERD Perspective, 5 HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 239 (2005).
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Violation of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, 14 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 45, 47 (2002).
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Harris, supra note 376, at 62.
380
Id.
381
ICERD, supra note 368, arts. 8, 9.
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HENRY J. STEINER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 920 (3d ed. 2008).
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discrimination to lodge a complaint with the Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination against the State
concerned. This may only be done if the State is a party to the
Convention and has declared that it recognizes the competence
of CERD to receive such complaints.385
Fifty-three State Parties recognize the competence of CERD to hear
individual complaints.386 ICERD also has a provision for state-to-state
complaints.387 Unfortunately, CERD decides only a few cases each year.388
Despite its name, ICERD does not attend only to racial discrimination.
ICERD’s Article 1 contains a broad definition of discrimination:
[A]ny distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on
race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the
purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition,
enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights
and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social,
cultural or any other field of public life.389
Given this broad definition of discrimination, it is not surprising that
CERD has addressed a wide range of group harms, from the ethnic violence
in Africa’s Great Lake Region to the illegal Israeli settlements in the
Occupied Palestinian Territories.390 Also, the standard recognized by CERD,
since its inception, includes both intentional and disparate impact
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Article 14 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination: Overview of Procedure, OFF. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS,
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/procedure.htm (last visited Dec. 27, 2011);
ICERD, supra note 368, art. 14.
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THE MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 433 (Ruth Mackenzie et al.
eds., 2d ed. 2010).
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ICERD, supra note 368, art. 11.
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STEINER ET AL., supra note 382, at 920 (noting, for example that CERD only decided six
cases in 2005 and 2006 combined).
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ICERD, supra note 368, art. 1.
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discrimination.391 CERD does not require proof of intentional or purposeful
discrimination; the complaint merely needs to show discriminatory effect.392
Some U.N. treaty bodies, such as the Committee Against Torture and the
Committee on Enforced Disappearances, focus on certain kinds of harms
such as discrimination,393 but CERD does not focus simply on one form of
group harm.394 More importantly, CERD recognizes connections among
group harms, ranging from discrimination to genocide.395 This has
something to do with the origins of ICERD. ICERD was introduced as a
response to a wave of anti-Semitic incidents.396 CERD sees itself as charged
with preventing and ending discrimination, ethnic cleansing, and other group
harms that could turn into genocide.397 CERD has developed an early
warning and urgent action procedure on patterns of oppression that may lead
to greater violence or that may even slide toward genocide.398
Many U.N. treaty bodies protect only certain kinds of groups,399 but
CERD puts all individuals and groups under its protection. As evidenced by
some Concluding Observations and General Recommendations, CERD does
not confine itself to concern for any one kind of group, such as minorities.400
In fact, CERD does not cover a minority’s right to a distinct identity.401
391

Audrey Daniel, The Intent Doctrine and CERD: How the United States Fails to Meet Its
International Obligations in Racial Discrimination Jurisprudence, 4 DEPAUL J. SOC. JUST.
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Rather, CERD sets out to protect all kinds of groups, be they minorities,
women, non-citizens (including refugees, migrants, asylum seekers,
displaced persons, detainees), or indigenous peoples.402 In short, CERD
protects vulnerable or disadvantaged groups. CERD focuses on these
vulnerable groups, in part, because they are particularly prone to genocide.
CERD clearly has adopted the term “vulnerable groups” and rejected
“marginal peoples.”403
CERD also has addressed secession issues, albeit indirectly. Georgia
charged Russia with violating ICERD Articles 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 by carrying
out discriminatory actions against South Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s ethnic
Georgian population.404 “Georgia further alleged that Russia [sought] to
consolidate changes in the ethnic composition [of these autonomous
regions],” so as to lay a foundation for their respective unlawful
secessions.405 For the first time, the ICJ took jurisdiction under ICERD and
issued provisional measures to both parties.406
Georgia’s case against Russia before the ICJ provides many of the
elements for constructing an adjudicatory framework for addressing
secession and related claims. Granted, South Ossetia and Abkhazia did not
seek independence from its parent state, Georgia, in the same way that
Kosovo sought a ruling on the lawfulness of its UDL. Instead, the case was
about Georgia trying to offset or block what it claimed were unlawful
external interferences against ethnic Georgians. Nevertheless, all the
earmarks of what a secession case would look like appear in that case.
First, the case draws the outlines of an adjudicatory hierarchy, not with
respect to lower and higher court rulings but with regard to interpretations.
minorities within their respective territories and shall encourage conditions for the promotion
of that identity.” G.A. Res. 47/135, art. 1, para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/135 (Dec. 18, 1992).
There is no comparable provision in the ICERD.
402
ICERD, supra note 368, art. 5; see also Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination—General Recommendations, OFF. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM.
RTS., http://www2.ohchr.org/English/bodies/cerd/comments.htm (last visited Dec. 27, 2011)
(CERD has issued thirty-four General Recommendations).
403
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and in particular of that of street children, indigenous populations, and human rights
defenders.” Concluding Observations on the Periodic Report of Cameroon, African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 39th Sess., para. 14 (2005).
404
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Georgia successfully argued that Article 22 of CERD407 permits an appeal
regarding interpretations of the treaty in question to the ICJ.408 The HRC, on
the other hand, does not have a comparable provision.409
Second, the ICJ took a strong stance by granting provisional measures
against Russia.410 The ICJ, in effect, ordered Russia to stop all forms of
group harm, including ethnic cleansing.411 Also, among the human rights
treaty bodies, CERD has distinguished itself as taking and adopting the
strongest measures and remedies. For example, CERD alone has instituted
both early warning and urgent action devices.412 These actions taken by the
ICJ and CERD show that international law indeed can use strong measures.
Third, the ICJ’s provisional measures and the claims before CERD
included recognition of the denial of self-determination as a discriminatory
harm.413 While ICERD, unlike the ICCPR, does not contain a provision on
the right of self-determination, the denial of self-determination certainly fits
within the treaty’s anti-discrimination mandate. Oddly enough, Georgia
claimed that Russia had denied the right of self-determination of ethnic
Georgians within South Ossetia and Abkhazia.414 However, it is just as
plausible to imagine representatives of South Ossetia and Abkhazia bringing
a similar individual complaint of denial of self-determination against
Georgia.415 Interestingly, the violations ascribed to Russia are not put in
terms of humanitarian law. Rather, Russia allegedly committed violations of
407
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408
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409
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human rights law, or, more accurately in our terms, it stood charged with
group harms.416 Of any of the human rights bodies, only CERD has
attempted to find the connections between these harms.
In conclusion, Georgia v. Russia contains all of the important elements of
a secession case: (1) it addresses, although only in passing, the lawfulness of
Georgia’s claims over the territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia; (2) it
treats, however obliquely, the denial or thwarting of self-determination as a
legally cognizable harm; and (3) it pays particular heed to all aspects of
group harm, from discrimination to ethnic cleansing, and worries about the
likelihood of genocide. Although the case does not contain an explicit
secessionist claim, it still encompasses all the ingredients of a secessionist
case. The basic difference between this case and a full-blown secessionist
one lies in the remedy, which in this case is not independence but rather the
cessation of external interference.
Therefore, CERD is ideally suited for handling secessionist claims.
While it does not have as active of a history of developing its jurisprudence
as the HRC does, CERD has all the makings of a viable future forum.
V. CONCLUSION
The Remedial Model, with its three-step inquiry, provides a morally and
legally defensible way of addressing secession. Before addressing the
secession claim, relational issues must be resolved: What is the nature of the
territory claiming secession, and what is its relation to the parent state? The
parent state must show that it has legal jurisdiction over the seceding
territory. This relational inquiry proves critical, particularly in cases where
secession attempts occur in the midst of a state that is disintegrating.
The Remedial Model also highlights two harms. First, international law
has consistently condemned states that remove internal self-determination
from a portion of its citizenry. By making internal self-determination the
linchpin of secession, the Remedial Model correctly places the right
incentives on states. If states want to avoid secessionist claims attaining
legitimacy in international law, they need to address demands for internal
self-determination. Finally, the Remedial Model treats secession as a form
of humanitarian intervention. If the seceding entity demonstrates violations
of peremptory norms by the parent state, then secession provides a remedy of
last resort that international law should recognize. If a parent state has
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denied internal self-determination and, for example, committed ethnic
cleansing against its people, then secession provides a justifiable remedy.
The relational questions raise interesting issues about Kosovo and Serbia.
Surprisingly, Serbia has highly questionable claims over Kosovo. Putting
these concerns aside, Kosovo’s substantive claims prove strong. Serbia
removed progress that had been made with internal self-determination in
Kosovo. Finally, Serbia, through ethnic cleansing, committed violations of
peremptory norms against Kosovo. Unfortunately, the ICJ missed a rare
opportunity to make a legal difference by adopting a Remedial Model. No
one should have any illusions that the Remedial Model will be warmly
received and readily implemented. However, recent conflicts make it
imperative to take steps toward realizing the Remedial Model. The failure to
act more quickly in Bosnia-fed NATO intervention in Kosovo. Yet, there
was an even earlier failure. If the international community had listened to
secessionist rumblings in Kosovo earlier, there could probably have been an
earlier and less violent intervention. Kosovo pales in comparison to the
current situation in a number of other areas around the globe. The future
cries out for an approach to secession that puts law and morality first.

